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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem of the Thesis 
The purpose of this study is to investigate Rudolf Otto's theory 
of religious knowledge. lt will be necessary to isolate the key figures 
in Otto's intellectual heritage. These will include Kant, Luther, 
Schleiermacher~ .Jakob Fries and Albrecht Ritschl. 
The study Will explore otto's methodology and attempt to de .... 
lineate the epistemological assumptions within his theory of religion. 
In addition, it will focus attention on otto's phenomenological descrip-
tion of the modalities of religious experience. 
0 
0 
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B. Sources 
Wherever otto' s thought has been translated these texts have 
been consulted~ Translated works mos.t pertinent to this study include 
The Idea of the Holy~" Religious Essays~ and The Philosophy of Reli-
gion. In addition Naturalism and Religiont- Mysticism East and West, 
India's Religion of Grace, and The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man 
were consulted. Where it was necessary to consider background 
material on otto secondary sources were consulted whenever the 
;material could not be found in translation. 
0 
0 
C.. Organization 
The thesis material will be divided into three main parts and 
organized in the following manner. Chapte;r-- n will seek to isolate the 
philosophical and theological traditions which influenced otto to the 
greatest extent. It will offer first a brief biographical sketch; then 
examine otto1 s major published works in the context of his intellec-
tual development. 
Among the ).nfluential figures upon otto's development his in-
debtedness to the religious insight of Luther will be noted. lt will be 
contended that otto is most influenced by the writings of Schleier-
macher and .Jakob Frie.s., On the basis of this conclusion the thinking 
of the.s e men will be examined somewhat in detail.. The chapter will 
als:o suggest the influence- of Ritschlian theology .on otto's own theory 
of religion. 
3 
Chapter Ill will seek to explore the methodology of otto. It 
wjll attempt to describe the basic structure of otto's thought which 
underlies his description of religion. Emphasis will be placed on 
otto's insistence upon the autonomy of the religious dimension of 
human life. 
otto's characterization of religion as an epistemological cate-
gory deserves close investigation. This category, which he calls the 
category of the Holy, will be described in detail. Its two parts, the 
non-rational portion, and the rational portion will be delineated with 
special emphasis upon the non-rational. 
otto's conviction that the non-rational element of rel;i.gion is a 
unique feeling experience will be documented. His characterization of 
this feeling as a mode of awareness will aid in a further understanding 
of his epistemology~ 
Throughout the body of Chapter lli otto's dependence upon 
0 
0 
Schleier;macher and Fries will be suggested along with his modifica-
tions of their insights. His justifications for such modifications. will 
be included in ~ach instance. 
4 
Criticisms of otto' s theory of religious knowledge will be 
suggested throughout the body of the study~ Special emphasis is 
pla-ced upon the criticism offered in Chapter ITI.. What is believed to 
be the major weakness.es: of otto's thought are suggested at this point~ 
Chapter lV explores Ottb1 s phenomenological description of the 
non-rational in religion. lt will investigate. his use of symbols and cite 
the specific symbols Otto uses to convey the religious dimension.. It 
will also isolate specific examples. suggested by Otto as indicative of 
the· non-rational .. 
Chapter V offers conclusions based upon the study of otto's 
thought., 
'0 
0 
CHAPTER II 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
A. Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to isolate the factors which 
contributed to the intellectual environment of otto. It will be divided 
into two sections. The 'first s·ection will offer a brief biographical 
sketch of Otto's life. It will concentrate on the nature of hi~ early 
religious influences as well as his. academic training. It will list the 
various teaching positions which Otto held and suggest some of the 
paths his thinking took during these times. Finally this section will 
describe briefly his major published works, placing them in the con-
text of Otto's life and· intellectual development. 
5 
Section two will emphasize the thinking of those men suggested 
as having the greatest influence upon Otto 1 s thought. It will attempt to 
show what specifically in each system Otto was attracted to. It will 
explore the relation of Otto to Luther, Schleiermacher, Jakob Fries, 
Ritschl, and Troeltsch. As often as possible the comments of Otto 
himself will be consulted in suggesting the thought of these men;. for 
in this way Otto's relation to each man is illustrated first hand. 
No attempt will be m8;de at a systematic exploration of the 
thought of any of these thinkers. The one exception to this plan will 
be a detailed examination of the religious philosophy of Jakob Fries. 
It will be demonstrated that Otto's theory of religion is only under-
stood against the background of Friesian Transcendental Idealism. 
It will not be the purpose of section two to offer criticism or 
corrections to the thought of the men in question. A critique of each 
0 
0 
man by Otto will be included in Chapter III, where a positive con-
struction of Otto's thought will be offered. 
6 
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B. Biographical Sketch 
.1. Educational Affiliations 
a} Formative Influences 
Rudolf Otto (1869-1937} was born in Peine in Hanover, Ger-
many. He was raised in the religious environment of the Lutheran 
Communion. 
7 
Otto's university education was received from the universities 
at Erlangen and Gottingen. During this period, the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the dominant theology was that of Albrect Ritschl 
(1822-89). Otto was deeply impressed by Ritschlian theology as well 
as the critical philosophy of Kant. 1 
b) Teaching Positions 
In 1897 Otto became Privat-Dozent in Systematic Theology at 
Gottingen and seven years later attained the status of Ausserordent-
licher Professor at the same university. 2 
During the early years of the present century Otto was greatly 
influenced by the writings of Schlei~rmacher. In addition, he was 
attracted to the thought of .Jakob Fries. Fries' philosophy was under-
going a revival of interest largely through the efforts of Leonard Nel-
son, a colleague of Otto's on the faculty of Gottingen. 
It is suggested by Harvey3 that 1910 was the significant year 
for the development of Otto's own distinctive contribution to religion. 
1. Robert F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto 1 s Interpretation of Religion 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 6. 
2. John W. Harvey, Translator's Preface, The Idea of the Holy 
(2nd ed.; London: Humphrey Milford, 1924), p. ix. 
3. Ibid. , p. ix. 
0 
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In that year he travelled to the East. The long trip included stops in 
North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, India,. China, and Japan. During 
8 
this and subsequent visits Otto studied in detail all the great religions. 
His interest in the religious dimension of man 1 s spiritual activity as 
expressed in various forms was st~engthened by the privilege to ob-
serve so wide a variety of religious ritual, art, and writings first 
hand. 
In 1914 Otto was appointed to an official Chair at Breslau and 
in 1917 assumed the Chair of Theology at Marlburg-on-the-Lahn. 
This latter position he held unti11929 when he was made Professor 
Emeritus at Marlburg. 
0 
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2. Major Published Writings 
Otto's first published work appeared in 1898. It was a study 
of the idea of the Holy Spirit in the thought of Luther. 1 
9 
The influence of Schleiermacher on Otto is partially confirmed 
by his next published work. This appeared in 1899 and was a centen~ 
nial edition of Schleiermacher' s Addresses on Religion 2 containing 
an introduction by Rudolf Otto. 3 
In 1904 Otto published Naturalistische und religiose Weltan-
sicht. 4 This work appeared in English in 1907. 5 In it Otto argues for 
the autonomy of the humap. spirit and suggests the limitations of natu-
ral science. He aims to refute the mechanistic theory of the structure 
and operation of the world. In addition he criticizes the rationalism of 
traditional supernaturalism in meeting the challenges naturalism offers. 
Soon after otto's defense of religion against naturalism he 
undertook a second defense. This effort was directed toward the tend-
ency in the theology of his day toward rationalism. It consisted of an 
exposition of Jakob Fries 1 Transcendental Idealism. 6 This work did 
not appear in English 7 until after the appearance of The Idea of the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Rudolf Otto, Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1898). 
II 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion (Gottingen: Vanden-
hoecht and Ruprecht, 1899). 
The contents o;f this introduction will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Rudolf Ottoi Naturalistische 'und religiose Weltansicht (Tubingeri: 
J. C. B. Mohr, 1904). 
Rudolf Otto, Naturalism and Religion, trans. J. Arthur Thomson 
(London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd. , 1907). 
Rudolf Otto, Kantische Friessche Religionsphilosophie (Tubingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr, 1909). 
Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. E. B. Dicker 
0 
0 
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Holy. 1 Davidson states 2 that it was considered one of the most im-
portant publications of the Neo-Friesian movement. It attempted to do 
_ for philosophy of religion what Nelson had already done in the episte-
mology of Fries. The content of this work by Otto will be further ex-
plored in the section of this chapter dealing specifically with Fries. 
In 1917 the most famous of Otto's works, Das Heilige, 3 made 
its appearance. Its immediate and widespread effect is noted by 
Davidson. 
Few books have made such large and immediate 
impact upon the religious world as Otto's major work, 
The Idea of the Holy. Published in 1917, its appeal was 
unquestionably enhanced by the widespread spirit of dis-
illusionment engendered at that time by the first World 
War. Acute need was felt for some interpretation of 
man's life and destiny more satisfying than the secular 
and purely rational outlook prevalent in the years pre-
ceding the war. otto's Idea of the Holy as definitely as 
Barth1 s Commentary on Romans provided a reorienta-
tion of life upon a distinctly religious basis, emphasiz-
ing a 11dimension of depth" in experience which liberal 
Protestant theology had too largely lost from view. As 
a result both Otto and Barth at once commanded general 
attention. 4 
Within the short span of twelve years from its first appearance 
in German, Das Heilige had appeared in seven other languages. 
Chapter ill of this thesis will deal extensively with The Idea of the 
Holy; for that reason its description will be omitted at this point. 
(London: Williams and Norgate. Ltd., 1931). 
L Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1923). All quotations in this 
thesis are from the Second Edition, 1950. 
2. Robert F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion, p. 7. 
3. Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige (Breslau: 1917). 
4. Davidson, p. 2. 
0 
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In 1931 Otto's Religious Essays1 appeared; This work is a 
compilation of articles and essays by Otto which were written mainly 
to elaborate the ideas first suggested in Das Heilige. It contains 
seven chapters dealing with specific theological concepts. These are 
followed by five chapters in which Otto continues his efforts of syn-
thesizing the phenomena of religion as they are found among the data 
of history. This section contains a valuable discussion of Schleier-
macher which will be utilized when Schleiermacher' s thought is anal-
yzed later in this chapter. 
Otto's growing interest in comparative religions' is reflected 
II 
in most of his works published after Das Heilige. West-Ostlich 
Mystik, 2 ~ppearing in English as Mysticism East and West, 3 is a 
study of the similarities and differences in the teaching of Sankara, 
the Hindu mystic,_ and Eckhart, the Dominican mystic. In this writ-
ing Otto contends that the concept of being, so often a topic of philo-
sophical and theological discussions, does not imply a lifeless concept 
of a completely abstract nature. Otto contends that Being. is life. 4 
Further consideration of the rational concept of Being leads him to 
suggest the inadequacy of even this concept. Being becomes merely 
\\ II 5 
an ideogram of the nWholly Othern. That the study of mysticism so 
frequently results in "negative theology" as the mystics attempt to 
express the wholly other, confirms, Otto believes, the autonomy of 
1. Rudolf Otto, Religious Essays, trans. B. Lunn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1931}. 
2. Rudolf Otto, West-Ostlich Mystik (Gotha: L. Keotz, 1926}. 
3. Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West, trans. B. L. Bracey and 
R. C. Payne (New York: The Macmillan Co. , 1932}. 
4. Ibid .• p. 172. 
\\ II 
5~ Ibid., p. 24. Otto's interpretation of Ideogram will be discussed 
below. 
0 
0 
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the religious dimension of man's spiritual life. 1 
Die Gnadenreligion Indiens und das Christentum2 appeared the 
same year in English translation as India' s Religion of Grace and 
Christianity. 3 In this work Otto examines the idea of the atonement 
as it is found in Christianity and Hinduism. The similarities in the 
two religions with regard to this concept are striking. Yet after he 
has thoroughly compared the two for similarities he isolates the differ-
ences concluding as he so often does, that the Christian concepts are 
superior in sublimity. Something, however, of the tension in all Otto's 
studies of comparative religion is evidenced in this work. Dillen-
berger cites this ambiguity in Otto's thought stating, "There is evi-
dence that he vacillated in his feelings toward Christianity as a per-
sonal faith and as distinct from other religions. 114 
Otto's last major publication was Reich Gottes und Menschen-
5 6 
sohn (The Kingdom of God and The Son of Man). In this work he 
elaborates the concept of divination which first appeared as a chapter 
in The Idea of the Holy. 7 He develops his statement in Das Heilige 
1. The meaning of negativity which Otto adopts will be discussed in 
Chapter III in connection with the valuative content of the experi-
ence of the holy. 
2. Rudolf Otto~ Die Gnadenreligion Indiens und das Christentum 
(Gotha: L. Keotz, 1930). 
3. Rudolf Otto, India 1 s Religion of Grace and Christianity (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1930). 
4. .John Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1953), p. 98. 
5. Rudolf Otto, Reich Gottes und Menschensohn (Munchen: C. H. Beck, 
1934). 
6. Rudolf Otto, The Kingdom of God and The Son of Man (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan Press, 1938). 
7. Chapter XVIII. 
0 
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that the holy can appear through a person. In Christiani~y this person 
is, of course,~ Christ. He suggests the ways God as the wholly other 
is nevertheless the father of the Lord Jesus Christ. 
Otto' s last completed monographs were German translations 
and analyses of the Bhagavad-Gita and the Katha-Upanishad {1934-36}. 
Failing health prevented him from delivering the Gifford Lectures at 
Aberdeen. These were to have been on the religious basis of ethics. 1 
1. Harvey, Translator's Preface, The Idea of the Holy, p. xviii. 
14 
C. Major Intellectual Influences 
1. Luther 
a) Relation to otto's Thought 
It is the purpose of this section to portray the debt which otto 
owes to the Great Reformer, Luther. otto makes frequent references 
to Luther's concepts in his own writings. In addition to his first pub-. 
lished work which was on the concept of the Holy Spirit in Luther, 1 
otto devotes Chapter XII in The Idea of the Holy to the topic "The 
Numinous in Luther. n ln addition, his chapter in Religious Essays 
on nThe Christian Idea of 1 Lostness 1 Compared with Moral Depravityn 
is largely an exposition of Luther's thought on this subject. In the 
reading of otto 1 s works one finds himself time and time again being 
directed by otto to some penetrating insight of Luther. 
It is suggested that two concepts in Luther greatly influenced 
otto's thought. First, otto discovered in Luther the idea of the non-
rational element in religion. Secondly, Luther's exposition of faith 
was interpreted by otto as a statement in more traditional terms of 
his own idea of the category of religion as a unique dimension of man 1 s 
life. These two significant elements as interpreted by otto will now 
be examined in greater detail. 
b) The Non-rational in Luther 
Luther wrote De Servo Arbitrio as an attack on the rationalism 
of Erasmus as applied to Christian doctrine. This work otto credits 
as having awakened him to the distinction in religion between religion 
as contained in conceptual terms and the "overplus 11 of religion which 
defies conceptualization. "I grew to understand the numinous and its 
1. Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther. 
0 
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difference from the rational in Luther' s De Servo Arbitrio long before 
I identified it in the qadosh of the Old Testa;ment and in the elements 
of 'religious awe' in the history of religion in general. " 1 
One gets so;me idea of the effect Luther must have had on the 
young Otto in a passage cited by Otto in The Idea of the Holy and taken 
from a sermon by Luther on Exodus 20. Otto suggests that one note 
the well nigh demonic character of the nu;minous feeling as Luther 
portrays it. 
Yea, for the world it seemeth as though God were 
a mere silly yawner, with mouth ever agape, or a cuck-
old, who lets another lie with his wife and feigneth that 
he sees it not. 
But he assaileth a man1 and hath such delight 
therein that He is of His jealousy and wrath impelled to 
consu;me the wicked. 
Then shall we learn how that God is a consuming 
fire . . . That is then the consuming, devouring fire ..• 
Wilt thou sin? Then will He devour thee up . . . For God 
is a fire, that consu;meth, devoureth, rageth; verily He 
is your undoing, as fire consumeth a house and maketh 
it dust and ashes. 2 
Otto suggests that in two concepts of Luther are exemplified 
the contention that religion transcends maD:' s ability to conceptualize 
it. They are the hiddeness and the majesty of God. 
The concept of hiddenness or mysteJ;"y of God emphasizes 
Luther' s contention that God is the wholly other. The mystery does 
not exist, Otto explains, because man has inadequate information 
about God. The mystery exists without resolution because of the non-
rational character of deity. Otto cites the following statements of 
Luther to exemplify this idea. 
God is altogether 1 mysteriis suis et iudiciis 
1. otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 99 .. 100. 
2. Ibid. , p. 99. 
0 
0 
impervestigabilis' (1 beyond tracking out in 'His mys-
teries and His judgements 1 ), ••• is in His essence 
hidden away from all reason, knows no measure, law, 
or aim, and is verified in paradox. 1 
16 
It is not Luther' s purpose to note merely an inconceivable paradox in 
God but to recognize that such paradox is an essential part of God's 
nature. 
Against the concept that God 1 s nature may be comprehended 
by the rational intellect, Luther's violent onslaughts against the 
11whore Reason" must be viewed. Luther drives at times to sugges-
tions of irrationality in his effort to convey the nature of God. 2 
The concept of the majesty of God as given in Luther' s 
thought does not lie in ideas of righteousness or goodness. It mainly 
suggests the awesome experience of one being confronted with God 
Himself. The experience of God's majesty produces fear and 
shuddering. 
. . . that before which his soul quails again and 
again in awe is not merely the stern Judge, demanding 
righteousness - for He is wholly a ' God of revelation' ... 
but rather at the same time God in his 1 unrevealedness 1, 
in the awful majesty of His very Godhead; He be;fore 
whom trembles not simply the transgressor of the _law, 
but th3 creature, as such, in his 1 uncovered' creature-
hood. 
John Dillenberger summarizes Otto's debt to Luther with regards to 
the non-rational element in religion. 
For Otto, Luther is a great symbol of that rare 
combination of the non-rational with the rational and of 
majesty with grace, through which the mysterious God 
takes on positive character for men without simply 
1. Ibid. , p. 101. 
2. Ibid., p. 100. 
3. Ibid. , p. 98. 
sinking into mystery __ .or.'-.succumbing to conceptual 
characterization. in Luther, the hidden God remains 
hidden, though his manifEtstation is always such that 
the center and source of !lfe is grounded in him. 1 
c) Luther' s Concept of Faith 
17 
In De Servo Arbitrio Luther contrasts the righteousness of 
faith and the righteousness ·of works. This distinction, Otto believes, 
clears the way for a recognition of the autonomy of religion. 2 Lu-
ther' s concept of the righteousness of faith suggests a religious 
category. Otto sees in Luther's description of the insights of faith 
something of the idea he hin;:tself -wishes to convey in the holy as an 
. ... ... "' 
a priori category. 
Thm;tgh for ·Lu:t]J.er faith begins more and more 
to taketh~ place of ,·knowledge' and 'love of God' 
(Gottes-Mi:nne) - whi'cB;k~ans a marked qualitative 
alteration of the whole re~igious temper, as compared 
with that of mystic~sm - y,et, despite the change, it 
remains obvious >that there are definite features in 
1 faith' , as the teirm is .:;,-f?.ed by Luther, which .jt!.stify 
us in classing_ it with.·the:-:rp.ystical ways of response to · 
which it is in apparent contrast, and clearly distin-
guish it from th~· fides t~Jight by the Lutheran school 
with its determinate,. well-ordered, unmystica~ tem-
per. 1 Faith' for L1,1t]l~r plays the same essential part, 
mutatis rq.utandt_s, as ~ knowledge 1 and t lo-ve' for the 
earlier mystic~?-A' -it i's the unique power of the soul, 
the adhaesio Dei, which. unites man with God: and 
' unity' is the v_ery signature of the mystical. So 
that when Lut~er says that faith makes man ' one cake' 
(ein Kuche) with God. <t~®hrist, or holds him 1 as a 
ring holds a jewel' (~i~~~§:tnnulus gemmam), he is not 
speaking any more £~!!9=·f:ixrely than when Tauler says 
the same of love. 1 Ei:l,itht~. for Luther as 'love' for 
Tauler and the mys~_9.s g~J;Ierally, is a something,.that 
'-t~· ~~~ 
;· 
1. Dillenberger, p. 79. 
2. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 104. 
0 
0 
cannot be exhaustively comprised in rational con~ 
cepts, and to designate which 1 figures 1 and 1 images 1 
are a necessity. To him 1 faith' is the centre of the 
soul - the fundus animae or 1 basis of the soul' of the 
mystics - in which the union of man with God fulfills 
itself. It is at the same time an independent faculty 
of knowledge, a mystical a priori element in the spirit 
of man, by which he receives and recognizes supra-
sensible truth, and in this respect identical with the 
1 Holy Spirit in the heart' (Spiritus Sanctus in corde). 
1 Faith' is further the 1 mighty creative thing' in us 
and the strongest of affects, most closely akin to the1 Greek 1 enthusiasm' ( E 'l)e ou o-i.c( b c=. c- e ""< i ). 
Davidson suggests that otto' s interpretation of Luther' s doc-
trine of faith finds support in H. R. Mack:i!ntosh. 
Luther' s notion of the righteousness of faith 
·unquestionably involves a religious category of mean-
ing and value completely other than and underivable 
from a moral or a "scientific" interpretation of experi .... 
ence. There is a fundamental element of religious 
autonomy latent therein. Faith in its entirety thus 
designates for him an experience with emotional, cog-
nitive and valuational aspects that set it apart as com-
pletely sui generis. It contains an insight and produces 
a conviction which .claim to transcend the limits of 
ordinary intelligence, a claim validated, however, not 
by rational reflection or logical argument, but rather 
by an immediate consciousness of self-authenticating. 
meaning and worth. 2 
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While otto is thus able to find in Luther confirmation of his own 
insistence upon the autonomy of religion1 he expresses dissatisfaction 
with one element in Luther's exposition of faith. This aspect ·of Otto's 
relation to Luther is suggested by Dillenberger. 
1. Ibid.' pp. 103-104. 
2. Davidson, op. cit., p. 25, citing H. R. Mackintosh, Types of 
Modern Theology (Scribners, 1937), pp. 6-7. 
0 
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When Otto thinks of the religious a priori, or 
the Holy as a separate and distinct category, he is 
happy to note that faith for Luther was an "indepen-
dent faculty of knowledge, a mystical a priori ele-
ment in the spirit of man, by which he-receives and 
recognizes suprasensible truth." He finds, however, 
that this recognition is always identified with the 
"Holy Spirit in the heart" and with Luther's Christ 
mysticism. It generally excluded the religious a 
priori in its own right. Where Luther did admitthe 
a priori on the basis of natural reason, he did not 1 include the numinous experience of God in himself. 
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Otto develops the concept of the numinous from its appearance 
in Luther. His characterization of religion departs from the state-
ments .of Luther generally bounded by the Christian tradition. What 
Luther says of the experience of the Christian God, Otto develops as 
a genuine element in other religions as well. 2 But it is the experience 
of the numinoUS;, as Luther seeks to portray it, which Otto finds as the 
central element in all religions. 
In addition to the specific concepts which Otto found in Luther 
and adapted to fit his own theory of religion Davidson suggests an 
additional influence of Luther upon Otto. Otto's studies of Luther, 
which highlighted his early studies and continued for the duration of 
his life, brought him in contact with the dynamic,_ prophetic character 
of the man himself. As a result something of Luther' s prophetic fer-
vor is carried by Otto into the realm of theol.ogical theory. It is a 
dynamic element in all of Otto 1 s writings. 3 
1. John Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, pp. 79-80. 
2. Ibid. , p. 80. 
3. Davidson, p. 26. 
0 
0 
20 
2. Schleiermacher 
a) Relation to Otto' s Thought 
Through two essays of otto one is able to gain a precise idea 
of his appraisal of Schleiermacher. These are his essays in Reli-
gious Essays entitled, "How Schleiermacher Re-discovered the Sen-
sus Numinis 11 and his preface to the centennial edition of Schleier-
macher' s On Religion. 1 
otto gained his lasting impression of Schleiermacher from On 
2 -
Religion which was Schleiermacher1 s first published work. 
It is otto' s contention that the insights which Schleiermacher 
illustrates in the Addresses are stated with an originality and enthu-
siasm that is forever afterward subdued in all Schleiermacher' s 
later writings. In fact otto sees very little in Schleiermacher' s 
later works which add appreciably to the early and original ideas 
found in the Addresses. 
Here in the Speeches, 3 however, one will find 
the original concepts which were systematically elab-
orated in his .later works, where they were assimi-
lated to theology and received the imprint of traditional 
churchly form. Without the Speeches, Schleier-
macher' s future work could not be interpreted with 
any degree of certainty. Many of these later 
\ 
1. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion (New Yorkt Harper and 
Brothers, 1958). All quotations will be cited from Harper Torch-
book, translated from the third German edition and reprinted by 
arrangement with Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd. , London. 
2. The Addresses were first published in 1799. The reference in 
otto's Religious Essays, p. 73 to the date 1789 must be in error. 
II 
3. Since the complete title of Schleiermacher1 s work is Ueber die 
Religion: Redert an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern and is 
translated On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, one 
finds the work referred to by the various titles On Religion, 
Speeches, Addresses, Reden, Ueber die Religion, etc. 
0 
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productions forfeited the original meaning, richness~. 
and impact in the interests of a stricter and more 
systematic treatment. In basic co¥tent the Glaubens-
lehre is poorer than the Speeches. 
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Otto's regard for Schleiermacher leads him in one place t0 
refer to " . . . that Church Father of modern Protestantism, Sch1eier-
macher. 11 2 The importance of Schleiermacher is further emphasized 
in Otto's Introduction to the· Addresses. The Addresses are of in-
terest to us from four different aspects. 
First, they must be viewed as an noriginal and daring attempt 
to lead an age weary with and alien to religion back to its very main-
springs .. n 3 Their success in achieving this goal makes this aspect of 
Schleiermacher' s thought worthy of study. 
Secondly, the Addresses may be regarded as an accurate 
mirror of the intellectual tenor of the age in which they were written. 
One gains a clearer picture of the effects of the Enlightenment and the 
Romantic reaction to its excesses. 
Thirdly, the Addresses are of special benefit to theologians, 
for, Otto contends, they are the n ... 'main gateway to the intellectual 
4 
world of the later renovators of Protestant theology.'~ 
The fourth and main interest in the Addresses is due to their 
association with the philosophy of religion. 
1. 
2. 
3.,. 
4. 
The Speeches aimed to defend and foster reli-
gion by a new examination and statement of its essence. 
Hence, despite their rhapsodic form, the Speeches be>-
came an essay in religious philosophy, indeed one which 
was destined to have an enduring effect on all future study 
Rudolf Otto, Introduction to On Religion, p. xii. 
Otto, Religious Essays, p. 69. 
Otto, Introduction to On Religion~ p. vii. 
Ibid.' p. xii. 
of the philosophy of religion. 
The questions it framed were decisive: What 
is religion? In what spiritual faculties of man is it 
rooted? How does it arise? How does it emerge in 
history? What are 11religions 11 ? What is Christian-
ity? What in religion is valid in a nnatural11 or 
"positive" sense? What is the meaning of a religious 
community? And further: What is the relation of 
religion tq. moral behavior? to Knowledge? What 
are the conceptions and teachings of religion, and do 
they have any validity? . . . How is the essence of 
religion to be found - both in its general conceptions 
and in its concrete, 0 individual0 forms? 1 
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Further evidence of the effect of Schleiermacher on Otto is 
given by the fact that Otto chooses to discuss Schleiermacher' s con-
ception of religion as his point of departure in The Idea of the Holy. 
otto found in Schleiermacher a penetra~ing analysis of religious ex-
perience and an insistence upon the autonomy of the religious element 
in life. The appeal of Schleiermacher' s Speeches appears then as no 
mystery since these aspects of religion are Otto's principal interests 
in all his major writings. 
b) Exposition of Schleiermacher' s Thought 
(1) Introduction 
For the exposition of Schleiermacher' s thought as it relates to 
Otto two principal .sources will be referred to. First the Speeches 
themselves will be frequently cited. Second, Otto' s exposition of 
Schleiermacher in the essays referred to above will be depended upon. 
Because the content of the Speeches reflects the age in which 
Schleiermacher lived it is felt they must be viewed in this context. 2 
1. lbid. , pp. xii - xiii. 
2. otto recognizes this fact and devotes a considerable portion of his 
Introduction to the Speeches to describing Schleiermacher' s cul-
tural environment. 
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For this reason a description of Schleiermacher' s cultural environ-
ment will first be offered. With this completed attention will be 
turned to Schleiermacher' s answers to the questions of the philosophy 
of religion as listed above. 
(2) Schleiermacher' s Cultural Environ:rnent 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) became acquainted with 
religion from the intimate world of the Herrnhut fraternity. His early 
seminary training at Barby resulted in a severe crisis in his own life. 
For here began an agonizing process of shedding the inherited ortho-
dox beliefs of his father. He also began to doubt the theism of the 
prevailing rational theology. "God and immortality disappeared before 
his doubting eyes as he began to examine the faith of his fathers and 
to cleanse his heart of the debris of former ages.'' 1 
Schleiermacher transferred to the University of Halle be-
coming thoroughly acquainted with the philosophy of the time. During 
this time Schleiermacher was lodged in the home of.an uncle, a 
rationalist-minded professor from whom he learned the nrationalist 
way of faith and practice." 2 
Schleiermacher encountered the f<>unders of the Romantic 
school when he became a chaplain of the 11 Charite" in Berlin. Here he 
came in contact with the then rich and active intellectual, literaryJ 
esthetic, and philosophic circle of that city. The group included such 
men as Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Novalis, Tieck, 
Schelling. Fichte, who had just been removed from his teaching posi-
tion at Jena for alleged atheism was closely associated with the group. 
At F. Schlegel' s insistence Schleiermacher became a contri-
butb:v!to the Athenaeum. This magazine was devoted to the esthetic, 
1. Otto, Introduction to Addresses, pp. xiii - xiv. 
2. Ibid., p. xiv. 
0 
0 
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literary, and philosophic interests of the young Romantic School and 
dedicated to the struggle against the defenders of the old order and 
rationalism. The leading publication of this latter viewpoint was the 
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. 
otto notes that while Schleiermacher was one of this group he 
was ln a special sense apart from it. 
It is true that neither the romantic youths nor 
the intelligent Jewesses, nor indeed the whole brilliant 
circle, would alone have done much to further there-
birth of religion) nor would they have desired to do so. 
Religion will not result from the mere resistence to 
rationalistic petrification of the spirit, nor yet from 
natures that are primarily poetic or aesthetic. It is 
an experience of a peculiar kind, is rooted in very 
different depths of significant human experience, and 
if it is to be promulgated with new life it requires not 
a poetical but a religious genius. The importance of 
that whole romantic circle, therefore, as far as re-
ligion was concerned, consisted wholly in the fact that 
it served as a stimulus to the one man amongst them 
who really knew from his own experience what piety 
meant and who surpassed them all in the profundity of 
his spirit, in the maturity and effectiveness of his 
character, and in the understanding of the virtues and 1 the errors of his time. This man was Schleiermacher. 
Schleiermacher, at the insistence of certain of the Romantic 
circle, produced the Addresses in 1799. He addressed them to the 
Hcultured among the despisers of religion. " Those he had in mind in 
this designation were the disciples of Herder-, Goethe, Kant, and most 
of all, Fichte. 2 
While he acknowledges his dependence upon the achievements 
of the Enlightenment, he sets himself strongly against two of the 
characteristics of the Age of Reason. He accuses the Enlightenment 
1. Otto, Religious Essays, pp. 72-73. 
2. Otto, Introduction to Addresses, p. xvi. 
0 
0 
25 
of confusing religion with metaphysics and morality. Repeatedly one 
finds the demand in the Addresses that this distinction be recognized. 
In addition Otto notes a change in attitude toward the world 
which Schleiermacher calls for. 
He did not wish to overcome doubt or atheism 
but a self-contradictory mood and state of mind over 
against the optimistic and self-conscious idealism of 
his timet which he himself strongly shared and 
asserted - especially the Fichtean heroic-pathetic 
11I 11 that boldly conceived of itself as Lord of the 
world and things, as something self-glorified and 
sovereign- Schleiermacher counterposed something 
quite different. This was a quiet humility and sub-
missiveness toward all that which encompasses and 
bears the world and things, as well as the ni 11 and 
ourselves, within itself. 1 
It is now proposed to examine Schleiermacher' s thought in the 
Addresses. 
(3) Schleiermacher' s Philosophy of Religion 
(.a) Man's relation to the UNIVERSUM. - Schleiermacher' s point 
of departure is a consideration of the "essence" of religion. By this 
was meant 11 • • • that which could be considered valid~ normal, 
normative in the phenomenon. 11 2 
He first considers man in the context of the world that sur-
rounds him. This world is conceived by the human intellect and 
formed by human action. By this concept he is implying that the uni ... 
versum is more than what is meant by usual astronomical sense of the 
term 11world11 • Commenting on Schleiermacher' s use of this term 
Otto notes 
In the sense in which he so frequently uses itt 
1. Ibid. , p. xvi. 
2. Ibid. , p. xvii. 
0 
0 
it signifies that great totality of being and becoming, 
of nature and of history in which we ourselves are 1 partly links and partly masters that forge the chain. 
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Man is related to the universum in three ways. First, man 
experiences a theoretic relation to the universum. This relatio~ is 
exemplified by science, especially physics. 2 Here man is concerned 
with discovering the laws which describe the phenomena of the world. 
If one is able to discover the "highest laws 11 of the universum his re-
lation is still theoretic but his discipline is metaphysics. 3 . · 
The second mode of man's relating himself to the universum 
is practical. By this he means we are able to influence it through our 
cultural and moral efforts both individually and as members of a group. 
By the two modes cited man can relate himself to his world. 
Through the use of his intellect he_ can sustain a theoretic relation to 
it, and through the use of his will he can maintain a practica~ relation. 
But this does not exhaust the possibilities. 
It should be noticed that in formulating the concepts of theoretic 
and practical relation to the world Schleiermacher has acknowledged 
the contributions of metaphysics and morality. However, when this is 
done Schleiermacher is outspoken in noting that religion does not con-
sist in either element. 
Wherefore~ my friendsf belief must be some-
thing different fro;m. a mixture of opinions about God 
and the wo±:~d, and of precepts for one life or two. 
Piety cannot be an instinct craving for a mess of meta-
physical and ethical crumbs. If it were you would 
scarcely oppose it. It would not occur to you to speak 
of religion as different fro:r_n your knowledge. however 
1. Otto, Religious Essays, p. 74. 
2. Schleiermachert Addresses, p. 30. 
3. Ibid. ' p. 30. 
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much it might be distant. 1 
Otto summarizes Schleiermacher' s reaction to the Enlighten-
ment in the following words. 
With all its great qualities t the philosophy 
of' the enlightenment' was characterized by an in-
tensely one-sided appreciation of human nature. It 
valued man essentially as a being thinking according 
to the laws of morality... It was blind to that wealth 
of human nature which lies outside the scope of these 
capacities,. to the rich profundities of immediate ex-
perience of life~ and nature, and history, which lie 
beyond rationalistic analysis and moralistic consider-
ations. The 1 enlightenment' understood the culture 
of the mind along its regular channels and moral cul-
tu;re according to pattern, but it had no room for the 
cultivation of the 1 soul' . . . Religion had on the one 
hand become metaphysics,. that is,. learned theological 
or philosophical theorizing on certain ultimate things, 
which were called God, the soul, the world, and such 
like; on the other hand it had become transmuted into 
moralistic and utilitarian precepts. But its essential 
spirit which$ as any pious person feels, is something 
quite different from the intellectual perception of some 
metaphysical things or the observance of ordinances; 
had escaped. Religion itself was suspect; it was 
termed 'enthusiasm' and' fanaticism'. The sensus 
numinis had died out. 2 
(b) Religion as piety. -- The third relation to the world is through 
the avenue of feeling. The world· in its profundity is experienced and 
by contemplation its eternal content is recogniz.ed. This relation is 
i:he religious dimension of man's spiritual life. Various quotations of 
Schleiermacher will now be offered to illustrate this original insight 
in Schleiermacher' s thought. 
The contemplation of the pious is the immediate 
L . Ibid., p. 31. 
2. Otto, Religious Essays, p. 71. 
-o 
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consciousness of the universal existence of all finite 
things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal 
things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek 
this and find it in all that lives and moves; in all 
growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to 
have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only 
as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal. 1 
Elsewhere he says, 
The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its 
highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to 
feel that aught single and particular is only possible 
by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our 2 being and living is a being and living in and through God. 
All is immediately true in religion, for except 
immediately how could anything arise? But that only 
is immediate which has not yet passed through the 
stage of idea, but has grown up purely in feeling. 3 
.. Religion is of such a sort and is so rare, that who-
ever utters anything of it must necessarily have had 
it, for nowhere could he have heard it. To the man 
who has not himself experienced it, it would only be 
an annoyance and a folly. 4 
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The passages in which Schleiermacher repeats his assertion 
that religion is a feeling experienced when the experient is confronted 
with the universe could be cited in abundance. The experience of the 
universum rather than producing arrogance in man leads rather to 
piety. 
1. 
2. 
3« 
4. 
The chief point in my Speech is now uttered. 
This is the peculiar sphere which I would assign to 
religion- the whole of it and nothing more. Unless 
you grant it_, you must either prefer the old confusion 
Schleiermacher, Addresses,. p. 36. 
Ibid.' p. 50. 
Ibid., p. 54. 
Ibid. ' p. 9. 
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to clear analysis;. or produce something else, I know 
not what, new and quite wonderfuL Your feeling is 
piety in so far as it expresses, in the manner de-
scr~bed, the being and life common to you and to the 
All. Your feeling is: piety in so far as it is the result 
of the operation of God in you by means of the opera-
tion of the world upon you. This series is not made 
up either of perceptions or of objects of perceJ?tion, 
either of wo-rks or operations or of different spheres 
of operation~ but purely of sensations and the influ-
ence of all that lives and moves around, which accom-
panies: them and conditions them. These feelings are 
,exclusively the elements of religion; and none 'are 
excluded. . . • If ideas and principles are t.o be any-
thing, they must belong to knowledge which is a 
different department of life from religion. 1 
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While Schleiermacher asserts that religion is to be found in 
feeling~ he also indicates that all fe~ling is not religion. Early in his 
work he notes: "I do not seek to arouse single feelings possibly be.-
longing to it, nor to justify and defend single conceptions, but I would 
conduct you into the profoundest depths whence every feeling and con-
ception receives its form." 3 Later in the work he cautions us ttRe-
member in the first place that any feeling is not an emotion of piety 
because in it a single object as such affects us, but only in so far as 
in it and along with it, it affects us as a revelation of God. " 4 
(c) The autonomous character of religion . ......- Schleiermacher does 
not refer to the place of religion in the phrase adopted for the heading 
of this section. The idea does appear in his Addresses. The 
1. Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
2. 11When, therefore1- we have asked whe;r-e now among all its proelu-
c;:es is religion chiefly to be sougp.t, we have found only one right 
and consistent answer. Chiefly where the living contact of man 
with the world fashions itself as feeling. " Addresses, p. 63. 
3. Ibid. , p. 11. 
4. Ibid.' p. 93. 
0 
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indications are that Otto finds his great attraction in Schleiermacher1 s 
thought because of his always implicit contention that religion must 
not be subjugated to any other function of man. 1 For thi~ fact it is 
Otto 1 s continuing effort to substantiate. 2 
With regards to the autonomy of religious dimension Schleier-
macher states: 
Man is born with the religious capacity as with 
every other. If only his sense for the profoundest 
depths of his own nature is not crushed out, if only 
all fellowship between him and the Primal Source is 
not quite shut off, religion would, after its own fash-
ion, infallibly be developed. 3 
Again, "I maintain that in all better souls piety springs necessarily 
by itself; that a province Df its own in the mind belongs to it, in 
which it has unlimited sway. 114 
(d) Religion- to have God. - Schleiermacher concludes the Address-
es with development of an idea strikingly similar to Otto 1 s chapter in 
The Idea of the Holy entitled "Divination of Deity. 11 "The whole of 
religion, It Schleiermacher asserts, "is nothing but the sum of all re-
lations of man to God, apprehended in all the possible ways in which 
any man can be immediately conscious in his life. 115 11The true nature 
o;f religion," he suggests elsewhere, "is .. ; immediate consciousness 
of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world. 116 
11And hereby, n Otto concludes, "Schleiermacher .•. 
1. Otto~ Religious Essays, p. 77. 
2. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 4. 
3. Schleiermacher, Addresses, p .. 124. 
4. Ibid.~ p. 21. 
5. Ibid.' p. 217. 
6. Ibid., p. 101. 
rediscovered the sensus numinis. " 1 This he did 
not only in a vague and general way but also he opened 
for his age a new door to old and. forgotten ideas: to 
divine marvel instead of supernaturalistic miracle, to 
living revelation instead of instilled doctrine, to the 
manifestation of the divinely infinite in event, person, 
and history, and especially to a new understanding and 
valuation of biblical history as divine revelation with-
out falling back again into the trammels of a primitive 
supernaturalism he prepared the way to a rediscovery 
not only of religion but of Christian religion and to a 
new interpretation of Christian religion, which was 
better and more modern than the old orthodox or 
rationalistic theology could give. 2 
1. Otto, Religious Essays, p. 77. 
2. Ibid., p. 77. 
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3. Jakob Fries 
a) Relation to otto's Thought 
The debt which Otto owes to Fries is reflected in The Philoso-
phy of Religion which Otto titled in German Kantisch,..Friessche Re-
ligionsphilosophie. At the time of the composition of this work Otto 
had come to the conclusion that Fries 1 theory of religion was supe-
rior to Schleiermacher' s, although earlier he had concluded the 
1 
opposite. 
Davidson gives a plausible explanation for Otto 1 s attraction to 
Fries 1 thought. 
The Friesian interpretation of religion, more-
over, while in general accord with that of Schleier-
I:nacher, is not expressed in the romantic and poetic 
spirit of the Addresses on Religion but in the concise 
and logical terminology of the Kantian Critiques. It 
is easy to understand its appeal to Otto at a time when, 
influenced already by both Kant and Schleiermacher, 
he was himself seeking some sound philosophical 
foundation for religious faith. 2 
The importance of Fries upon Otto's thought must be empha-
sized. One finds in the whole of Otto 1 s writings .no attempt to organ-
ize a tightly knit theological system based upon the experience of the 
Holy. Where Otto feels a systematic structure is needed he refers 
to Fries 1 system which he had explored and expanded. Investigation 
of Otto's philosophical method has tended to confirm the following 
observation by Davidson. 
otto himself.unfortunately does little more t:han 
indicate the general character of the metaphysics to 
which his Idea of the Holy points. Upon almost every 
1. Otto, Philosophy of Religion, p. 15. 
2. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion, pp. 153-54. 
crucial issue of this sort he is content to turn to the 
philosophy' of Fries for suggestion, finding in the 
Friesian idealism the ultimate justification as well 
as the initial inspiration of his own position, and 
never attempting any systematic statement of philos-
ophy other than that sketched in his early Kantisch-
Friessche Religionsphilosophie (1909). 1 
b) Similarities in Thought of Fries and Schleiermacher 
The strong similarities in the thought of Jakob Fries (1773 -
1843) and Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834) are obviously partly to be 
explained by their being contemporaries. This does not, however .• 
completely explain the fact. It is interesting to note that Fries is 
also contemporary with Shelling (1775 - 1854), Hegel (1770 - 1831), 
Goethe (1749 - 1832), Fichte (1762- 1814), none of whom bear such 
resemblance to his thought as does Schleiermacher. 
Some of the common factors in the lives and thought of Fries 
and Schleiermacher will now be noted. 
First, these two men were both raised in the same religious 
group. This was the Moravian Brethren (Herrnhuter). It would 
appear that this fact bears significantly on the emphasis of both men 
on the importance of the contemplative life of piety. 
Secondly, both men suggest that man's relation to the world 
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is complex. Schleiermacher' s threefold theory of Knowledge isolates 
, man' s theoretic, practical, and religious relation to the world. 
Fries will suggest the avenues of Wissen,. Glauben, and Ahndung as 
modes of experience .. 
Thirdly, each man suggests that the insights of his third 
level of knowledge leads to the life of piety, which both distinguish 
f;r-om simple moral goodness. 
1. Ibid. , p. 133. 
0 
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Fourth, both state that the religious insights are in terms of 
feeling. 
Fifth, each man asserts that the insights of religious feeling 
lead man to the conviction of an inner telos in the world. 1 
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As mentioned above, however, there are contrasts in the 
approach of the two men. Schleiermacher, along with all the romantic 
philosophers, was·.-. in violent revolt against the Enlightenment. Fries, 
Otto states, shared no interest in this quarrel. 2 
In addition Fries never makes the cleavage between knowledge 
and religion which Schleiermacher does .. 
Religious conviction must be true and must be 
able to prove its truth: i. e. , it must lay claim to be 
Knowledge. Otherwise Religion itself is impossible; 
at most it could claim to be the loose day,...dreaming of 
a sensitive heart. At this point there is the most radi-
cal difference between the philosophy of religion iri 
Schleiermacher and in Fries. 3 
Otto's appraisal of Fries serves as a summary of his reason 
for his conclusion that Fries is superior to Schleiermacher in com-
prehensiveness, thoroughness and solidity. 
While we share the opinion and conviction, 
gradually gaining ground in philosophic circles, that 
in the sphere of the science of religion, after all our 
histories, comparisons,. inductions, individual im-
provizations, and clever hypotheses, we must go 
back to that massive and systematic investigation of 
the rational principles of religion in the human intel-
lect which, continuing the preparatory work of the 
"Aufklarung, " German Idealism undertook in various 
;phases of this philosophical school, Fries and his 
way of thinking have given us the most trustworthy 
1. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 147. 
2. Otto, Philosophy of Religion, p. 22. 
3. Ibid. , p. 24. 
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results, and that they are of importance as a basis 
for our. own inquiry. 1 
c) Exposition of Fries' Thought 
(1) Methodology of Fries 
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The philosophy o'{ Fries is a speculative philosophy in the tra-
dition of the Aufklarung2 philosophers. He accepts with Kant the con-
viction that the primary task of any philosophy is a critique of human 
reason itself. This approach attempts to isolate the contribution to 
knowlE;!dge which the reasoning mind makes in interpreting experience. 
Only after isolating this element in any epistemology is it then possible 
to say anything of the world apart from the knowing subject. 
Fries seeks to elaborate the philosophy of Kant in two ways. 
First, Kant, he felt, had reasoned unjustifiably from the a priori to 
the ideal nature of knowledge in the epistemological process. This 
fallacious inference was the cause of the Kantian epistemological 
dilemma in which the ding-an:sich could never be known from the 
knowledge structured by -the reasoning subject. Fries attempts to 
demonstrate that the ability to criticize the knowledge of the phenom-
enal world structured by reason as inadequate to an understanding of 
the real world is in itself the first step in an escape from the Kantian 
dilemma. He seeks to make us aware of a deeper form of knowledge 
than even the categories. This feeling of truth, Wahrheitsgefuhl, 
enables us to both recognize the limitation of the ·phenomenal world as 
structured by the categories, while at the same time transcending this 
limitation. 
Secondly, Fries attempts to give priority to the religious 
1. Ibid., pp. 15-16. Emphasis mine. 
2. Aufklarung. This word has been left in the original for lack of a 
concise expression for "The Philosophy of the Enlightenment". 
c 
dimension of man's life. He rejects Kant's locating religion in the 
realm of the moral. Rather he regards religion as the highest form 
of man' s esthetic judgment. He develops an epistemology which in-
corporates religion as a vital part of any attempt of the part of man 
to understand his world, himself, or his God. 
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Fries regards the problem of knowledge, or as he terms it, 
the nature of truth as of fundamental concern to philosophy. 1 There-
fore his first aim; like Kant's, is directed to natural philosophy 
11 
• • • to obtain those kinds of metaphysical knowledge and principles, 
through which mathematics and natural science (to which he also 
considers psychology to belong}, and consequently the whole world of 
'knowledge' in general is possible. It is exactly from this point that 
his work proceeds to the doctrine of 1 ideas' and to the world of 
'faith'. 2 The nature of truth, as conceived by Fries, will now be 
examined. 
(2) The Nature of Truth 
The optimism of the Aufk.larung was refl~cted in the feeling of 
man at this time that through human reason the key to understanding 
man and his world could be found. The great scientific systems of 
Newton and Galileo had 11 • • • substituted rigidly causal knowledge for 
semi-animalistic ideast universal and necessary cognitions for un-
stab+e opinion. 11 3 Through the methods of empirical science and the 
deductive method, principles of order had been found enabling man to 
structure his complex of sensory data and through application of 
logical models relate himself to his surroundings. He could now not 
1. Davidson, p. 135. 
2. Rudolf otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 44. 
3. Ibid. ' p. 45. 
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only survive, but also manipulate that which had previously dominated 
him. Man was no longer in the world as much as he was now its center. 
Yet the skepticism of Hume demonstrated that empirical obser-
vation can never establish a universal law. The scientific method is 
rather itself dependent upon a law which cannot be empirically estab-
lished, viz. the law of causality. Similarly, any logical system rests 
upon basic postulates, theii?-selves incapable of demonstration as 
provable or unprovable. 
The critical philosophy of Kant sought to provide a solution to 
the Humean skepticism. Kant, by a critical examination of human 
reason, suggested that we possess certain kinds of real knowledge a 
priori and even the ordinary understanding is never without them. Not 
only in the structuring of empirical data but also in the judgments in 
mathematics the huma.n intellect acts synthetically in accordance with 
a priori principles within .its structure. 
In this connection it is significant that this kind of 
philosophy does not proceed from Descartes' idee 
.fixe 11Doubt everything"~ but from the assurance that 
we possess cognitions,. especially in the sciences, 
which, in spite of all skeptical attacks., march on as 
surely and as unerringly as mathematics and physics. 
Philosophy's task is not forcibly to convert skeptics, 
but to bring to an understanding .of the elements of 
their own actual knowledge people who have been 
trained to quiet thought and live an independent life 1 
of their own, with a natural ?-nd healthy trust in reason. 
Kant stated that deeper than our knowledge of things or mathe-
matical knowledge was another knowledge. This knowledge, intuitive, 
purely rational, is known to us partly in the concept of the categories. 
Such knowledge when schematized by the knowledge of empirical re ... 
ality enables us to construct a natural science or a mathematical 
1. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
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system. The laws of science then appear as judgments which are 
made by the mind and which are determined by its nature. The deri-
vation of·the categories as suggested by Kant are briefly listed as 
follows: 
We know a priori, without the need of experience not how 
many things there are or even if there are some things, but rather 
that if something is that it exists as one or in the many and that the 
multiplicity is comprised in the unity of the individual. Similarly, 
although we may not know how everything or even anything is consti-
tuted, we do know that if something exists it is constituted some way. 
Thus everything that is is subject to the categories of quality. 
Continuing to Kant's metaphysical catego;des: we are immedi-
ately aware that that which is is only conceivable as a thing with quali-
ties --the category of subsistence and inheritance. Behind our per-
ceptions we realize a something which is producing them. We are 
aware that the qualities are in relation to one another and are possessed 
by something which holds them in their relations, relations we are 
aware of -- therefore the categories of causality and .community through 
reciprocal action. 
The Humean criticism that in the experience of things we cannot 
prove their existence is correct. Kant demonstrates that their exist-
ence is assured by another knowledge, an intuitive a priori knowledge 
of the reason itself. It is through the structure of pure reason that 
skepticism is both possible and resolvable. 
But after this quaestio facti we are faced with 
the quaestio juris. Are these categories valid? The 
question is first answered by Fries. He proves that 
all nature-concepts are merely the various forms of 
one fundamental idea of the reasoning mind -- the 
idea of unity and necessity; or differently expressed 
that they are single and individual determinations of 
the fundamental knowledge about the necessity and 
unity of everything that is, in general which rests on 
0 
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the foundation of every single Reason as something 
most immediate and most profound. 1 
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From the development of the categories Kant concluded that 
the knowledge obtained was ideal. The picture of reality which each 
individual obtains is sensuous perceptions acted upon by the ~ priori 
structure of the mind. Therefore it is not possible to know the world 
of thing separated from the taint of the structuring mind. 
Fries attempts to avoid the agnosticism inferred in the Kantian · 
dualism by developing an epistemology along more idealistic lines. 
Kant, he felt, had too soon abandoned the insights of pure reason on 
c:>rder to proceed to the moral faith.of the Critique of Practical Reason. 
Kant's primary interest was in the moral rather than in the intellectual 
realm and this prejudice had caused him to give a biased investigation 
of epistemology. 2 Fries proposes to accept the insights of the Critique 
of Pure Reason as to the existence of the categories" but to elaborate 
the sysi;.em to the point where a knowledge of reality is demonstrated 
as justifiable. 
By way of introduction, Fries suggests that one refutes the 
Kantian dualism in the effort to state it. While Kant denied the valid-
ity of the a priori insights as yielding knowledge of the world beyond 
the phenomenal world, he derived not only the fact but also the char-
acter of the real world. To do this~ Fries suggests, he had to assume 
the validity of the very categories he was consciously denying. 
Leonard Nelsont a student of Fries offers an elaboration of this point. 
If we speak of a thing-in-itself, we already employ 
therein the category of substance; if we term this the 
cause of our perception, we thus relate it to the 
category of causality; if we attribute existence to it, 
1.- Ibid., p. 49. 
2. Davidsont p. 138. 
we likewise employ the category of existence. The 
statement that all a priori principles are inapplic-
able to things-in-themselves leads, therefore, to 
contradiction .. 1 
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Kant's unsuccessful attempt to deny the ultimate validity of a 
priori knowledge has only succeeded in establishing its absolute pri-
ority in all human reason. But as yet our discussion of Fries has not 
included what he proposes to demonstrate a.s knowledge of the real 
world. His solution to this problem involves a reexamination of the 
Kantian antinomies. 
( 3) The Kantian Antinomies 
In an examination of cosmology Kant noted contradictory con-
clusions which occurred. Taking the form of theses and antithesis 
these ideas were established by Kant through what he considere.d 
methods of proof. Since proofs could be obtained for contradictory 
conclusions, this "scandal of reasonn made it apparent to Kant that 
the mind does not possess actual knowledge of the world beyond the 
phenomena. The antinomies as suggested by Kant are as follows: 
The world of our experience is within a space,...time continuum. 
As such it is conceivable that both spatially infinite and temporally 
eternal attributes are applicable to the world. Yet any infinite re-
gression in time or space is rationally unintelligible. To speak of an 
infinite· time as now completed, as each moment completes it, ;i.s a 
contradiction in terms. Similarly1 this reasoning may be applied to 
any fixed point in space. 
In addition, the paradox of time can be illustrated another way. 
What is meant by living "in time11 ? Nothing seems clearer to us at 
,, 
1. Leonard Nelson,_ Uber das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem (Got-
tingen, 1908), p. 175, quoted in Davidson, p. 141. 
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first consideration. One is cognizant of past, future, and also a 
present. But what of the term 11present11 as it is more closely ex-
amined. How long is it? To speak of the present moment makes it 
history. Ultimately the present can be rationally reduced to a line, 
to use a spatial metaphor. This line is the intersection of the past 
and the future. It has no dimension of width~ in fact appears not to 
exist at all. 
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Secondly, Kant gives another instance of the antinomy of rea ... 
son in the concept of siJnple and complex.. On the one hand our experi-
ence shows us that everything experienced is complex. What is ex-
perienced can be disected, in which case are found additional elements 
themselves complex combinations capable of resolution into smaller 
complexes. Experience shows this process to be never-ending. 
But reason says that in every complex something is causing it 
to be complex. Something has the power of manifesting itself in the 
complexes we examine. This 11something11 ~ust be at the root of 
reality. Reason cannot, then, entertain the infinite regression of 
complexes. Ultimately the simple is to be found which is producing 
the complexes of our experience. The concepts of simple and complex 
have only led in our consideration to contradictory conclusions. 
Thirdly, the antinomy of causality and freedom is noted by 
Kant. Nothing seems more apparent to us than the fact that experi-
enced events have causes. Man, whether in the superstitious stage 
of development or in the stage of systematic investigation of the phen-
omenal world, has felt this conviction so strongly that it has been 
implicit in his action. He has always sought to explain the appearance 
in terms of something which caused it. The event without a cause is 
beyond the world of experience. 
Yet reason tells us that a free cause would have to exist. If 
all causes were interdependent there would be no explanation of the 
c 
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beginning, no 11peg to hang the chain on. 111 
( 4) Fries 1 Solution to the Kantian Antinomies 
Much of the difficulty in the problem which Kant had raised 
was due to his unfortunate terminology. Fries suggests that Kant's 
choice of the term 11proof'' to characterize the demonstration of the.-
sis and antitheses in the antinomies obscured a vital distinction be.-
tween the two sides of the problem. 
Kant was aware of the fact, and Fries reemphasized that the 
subject of the thesis was not the subject of the antitheses in the an-
tinomy. Strikingly the antinomy contrasts the world of sense experi-
ence; the phenomenal world, with the world of pure intelligibility. 
The latter Fries believed to be the real world. Each statement of the 
antitheses (stated first in Kant's development of the antinomies), was 
a statement of the world based upon experience of the phenomenal 
world. Phenomenal knowledge of the world schematizes the categories 
and to this extent limits the validity of the ideas produced by the 
process. The categories themselves become limited and restricted. 
In contrast, the knowledge of the theses is the knowledge of 
Pure Reason. It is a valid knowledge of the real world of pure in-
telligibility. It is knowledge unrestricted by the limitations of sche-
matization. How Fries hopes to demonstrate this will be discussed 
later .. 
What is the cause of the confidence which is felt in the insights 
of reason? Why does each thesis of the antino;rny, once it is grasped, 
attach itself to us with certainty? To explain this fact Fries points to 
a truth deeper than empirical truth. This truth transcends that ob-
tained from experience. It is du~ to the a priori structure of the 
1. Otto, The Philosophy of Religion" p. 73. 
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mind itself. It is this truth, intuitively felt, immediately experi-
enced,_ which gives us the certainty to be found in a mathematical ex-
ercise correctly done. This "transcendental truth11 validates the in-
sights of reason, for example the theses of the antinomy. It enables 
us to transcend the limitations of the categories schematized by the 
phenomenal world. 
Truth, while traditionally defined as agreement of the idea with 
its object, becomes something different for Fries. Since he has 
suggested that the mind possesses 11transcendental truthn, deeper than 
logical system, truth becomes the agreement of the rational concept 
with this "transcendental, truth". "We cannot say, therefore, of truth 
as contrasted with erro;r- (as is customarily done} that truth is the 
ag;r-eement of .idea with its object, but only that the truth of a judgment 
is the same with the immediate knowledge of reason. 11 1 
The immediate knowledge of reason cannot be demonstrated 
logically. Such is an b:npossibility, since the validity of logic itself is 
based upon this transcendental truth. The assurance of the fact of this 
reason is given by the "feeling o;f truth".< 
Fries is not to be misconstrued as saying that error is im-
possible. Errors occur both in the realm of conceptual knowledge~ 
where the reasoning intellect interprets the data of the senses, and in 
the realm of pure logical reflection. One may make erroneous judg-
ments in the research of history, science, or the elaboration of ~oral 
alternatives. Mathematical systems may contain contradictory axi-
oms and go undetected. However, in the knowledge of the ~priori 
truths of pur.e reason and to some extent in the realm of esthetic 
1. Jakob Fries,_ Wissen~ Glauben, und Ahndung {Jena, 1805), p. 29, 
quoted in Davidson,_ p. 139. 
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judgment1 the feeling of truth, Wahrheitsgefiihl, precludes the possi-
bility of error. 
( 5) Reduction of the Categories 
If the ideas of the antinomies are examined in detail, it is ob-
served that each antithesis is a statement of particulars continuing 
unendingly. Each thesis, however, points to a completion. In this 
polarity of ideas there is demonstrated the underlying structure of 
Pure Reason itself. An appreciation of the significance of this fact 
leads to Fries' doctrine of Unity and Necessity. Even more basic 
then the particular categories, the idea of unity and necessity points 
to the structure of reason. nThe demonstration of this fundamental 
idea in reason is quite the most important thing in Fries 1 criticism. 112 
The idea of unity structures our sensory impressions. Such 
an idea, we are cautionedt is not to be thought of as suggesting all 
the many in the world are really one thing. This is the confusion 
Monism makes. Monism itself is, however, only a misinterpretation 
of the conviction of unity possessed by reason within ite~ structure. 
The idea of unity suggests a synthetic unity in what would otherwise 
be a rtrhapsody of perceptions 11 • It suggests a coherence principle in 
the world of being and happening. The metaphysical categories of 
substance, causality, and reciprocal action are demonstrated by 
Fries to be 11dimensions 11 of reason' s fundamental idea of being as 
synthetic unity. 
"Substance" is law and form of unity for 11acci-
entia". Causality and Dependence are the relations of 
the unity and association of things with each other. 
Community through reciprocal action is the association 
1. This point will be greatly elaborated in the section on Fries 1 
theory of Ahndung. 
2. otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 78. 
of each and everything in general to the unity of a 
World-AU. l 
45 
Again, as the world is viewed, critical reflection on the judg-
ments made about it exposes another fundamental idea of reason. The 
idea of accident or chance loses meaning. Intuitively one becomes 
aware of the fact that explanations in terms of chance or accident 
stem from insufficient perception on our part. One feels that per-
ceiving more would resolve the mystery; a deeper knowledge would 
expose a structure where none is now obvious. 
The best illustration of the intuitive awareness possessed by 
all of the necessary unity in the data of the world as given to us is 
found in the ideas of time and space. These concepts appear out of 
our perceptions. The perceptions do not contain them. The mind, by 
its nature develops and uses them. 
How is necessary unity reflected in spatia-temporal ideas? 
The concept of space is itself the need of the mind to find a bonding 
agent, ~ "home" for the extentional character of our perceptions. 
The idea of time reflects the need to order the successional character 
of the perceptions. 
The ideas of necessary unity may, however, be denied in the 
space-time world, despite the dim awareness even here of unity and 
necessity. Each antitheses of the antinomy demonstrates the parti-
cul8:rity of sense data. Yet one must immediately point to the thesis. 
This demonstrates with power that the mind with its categories un-
schematized by space-time limitations feels with certainty the prin-
ciple of completion in the "real" nature of things. 2 
1. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
2. Ibid. , p. 79. 
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(6} Wissen and Glauben 
It is now possible to move to the second type of knowledge 
which Fries delineates. All knowledge obtained from sense data, sys-
tematically investigated in scientific endeavor, Fries designates 
Wissen. He agrees with Kant that such knowledge, i.e., knowledge of 
the phenomenal world, cannot bring knowledge of the ding-an-sich, the 
noumenal world. But whereas Kant concluded that this fact dictates 
the necessity for an epistemological dualism~ Fries reasons different-
ly in an attempt to conserve an epistemological idealism of a more 
monistic type. 
The reason, he contends, that the categories lose their validity 
in investigating the phenomenal world is due to the schematization, 
i.e., limitation, placed upon them by the natural world. 
When space-time attributes are removed by an "ideal 
schematism" from the category of substance, the 
qualitative attributes of substance lose only their 
phenomenal form. Real, that is, completely intelli-
gible substance is then revealed as spiritual being in 
a complex of qualitative attributes without spatial or 
temporal limitation. This is actually the meaning 
contained in the idea of soul,. in which according to 
Fries, the true nature of substance is immediately 
known. The category of causality in like manner, 
when freed from the restriction imposed by space-
time relationships, no longer involves an infinite 
conditionality. Pure and completed causality is rather 
that creative causality which finds intelligible state-
ment in the idea of an unconditioned freedom of the 
moral will. Finally, the category of community 
through reciprocal action (the most general form of 
the idea of universal unity and necessity}, when all 
time-space limitation is removed, points to an 
eternal ordering of things in accord with final pur-
pose; and this the idea of deity expresses. 1 
1. Davidson, pp. 144-145; Fries, Neue Kritik der Vernunft, Vol. XI, 
pp. 221-293; Wissen, Glauben und Ahndung, pp. 128-136. 
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·The rational knowledge obtained by the reason when space-
time limitations on the categories are removed is designated Glauben, 
faith. By the method now described Fries hopes to demonstrate that 
faith is solidly grounded in the reason and is therefore an indispensable 
source of knowledge. By this method he hopes to have the place of 
faith solidly grounded as he proceeds in his philosophy to the highest 
form of knowledge, Ahndung, in which r:eligion becomes all-important. 
(7) "Ideal" Schematization of the Categories 
Fries places greatest emphasis upon the "peculiarly meta-
physical" categories. However all the categories~ when freed from 
space-time schematizations expose ideas widely held by religions; 
r 
sometimes vaguely expressed in myth or rite, but persistent because 
ol 
they are held by men with inner certainty, Wahrheitsgefuhl. 
For the categories of quantity one obtains, when space-time 
limitations are removed, the idea of Absolute Being, absolute used 
here in the sense of complete, absolutum. Similarly, when the same 
restrictions are removed from the categories of quality, one is led to 
the idea. of Simple, in the sense of incomplex, and Reality "without 
phase 11 • The categories of modality suggest the idea of Eternity~ 
This is the idea of cessation of spatio-temporal 
existence and everlastingly "conditioned" existence 
in the Unconditioned, i.e., in the absolute general 
and fundamental Necessity of all that Is ("Uncondi-
tioned" side by side with "completedn~ the second 
fundamental of 11absolute 11 Being. )1 
The first category of relation is inherence and subsistence. In 
what ways does Wissen give the knowledge of what is? It does so by 
two irreducible modes. First,. the quantitative mode is suggested. 
1. otto, The Philosophy of Religion; p. 82. 
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Matter can be classified according to characteristics of extensions-
change of motion~ and pos~tion. Again, it may be further classified 
qualitatively. Its qualities of color, odor, hardness, sweetness 1 etc. 1 
may be compared with other samples of matter. In addition, its effect 
upon living organisms may be noted in terms of inner emotive quali-
ties, fear, hate, pain, etc. But it would appear that the limits of 
Wissen have been reached. General statements about the subject of 
investigation seem limited to ideas of persistence and duration. And 
this incomplete conclusion, Fries suggests, leaves a serious question 
unanswered, viz., how ~s the transition from the ndeadn nature of 
matter to the nliving'" possible? When the limitations of space -time 
are removed, what remains ? Matter has; to be sure, lost its phenom-
enal form. However the content remains. The category of substance 
leads to a knowledge of the spiritual. It is then that an explanation for 
the ego-selfconsciousness is realized. The spiritual self is felt as 
indivisible and incomplex. It is from this inner cognition that the idea 
of soul gains meaning and is established as an ingredient of the cate-
gories as ideally schematized. 
It is from this inner cognition that it is possible to infer that 
the world may indeed be one of spiritual beings. Even the attempt to 
speak of an ingredient of man as nimmortaln belies the inner convic-
tion that we experience something comprehended neither in time or in 
space and capable of resisting their power. "It is the 1 pure appercep-
tion', the Ego-consciousness; which enables the category of Substance 
to be subsumed with safety for the spiritual as opposed to the material. ,J. 
· Kant's second category of relation is cause and effect. What 
form has this taken in the material world? The laws of physics admit 
no freedom. If the present conditions of a material body are fully 
1. Ibid., p. 85. 
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known, it is always theoretically possible to predict the next "moven. 
Under this idea it is conceivable that a being possessing complete 
knowledge of the present1 would be able to predict what each entity of 
its world would do next. 
Just as the idea of substance with its subsistence and inherit-
ance,_ ideally schematized, yielded the idea of soul, incorruptible, 
and above; time and space, so this spiritual being with the restriction 
of material causality inoperative suggests the idea of freedom. But 
this freedom of the spiritual being is not to be thought of as a complete 
indeterminism1 suggesting that spiritual action results from caprice. 
The idea of spiritual freedom points to the will of the spiritual being. 
The spiritual being is soul, which suggests the idea that the person is 
able to resist the power of space-time restrictions. The spiritual be-
ing is will, which suggests the dynamic element in personality through 
which the determinism of space-time is overcome. 
The third category of relation is community through reciprocal 
action. rtldealu schematization of this category., Fries believes, pro-
vides a rational, metaphysical argument for- deity. 
The question posed by philosophers, often dismissed as unan-
swerable, but always. recurring is, "Why is there something instead 
of nothing? n Examination of the phenomenal world shows not only that 
something exists, but also that it exists within certain patterns of 11be-
haviorn. Granted again with the superbeing there is knowledge of what 
is; what has been,_ the question, nWhy? rt remains unanswered. The 
persistence of this question, and the lack of an answer from the phe-
nomenal world demonstrates, according to Fries, the cognition of 
pure reason that a being must exist to answer the query. 
Fries rejects the solution of pantheism which would locate 
1. Such masters of the 'tworld formulan were suggested by Laplace 
and Dubois -Reymond. 
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deity within the frame of what is for us .--the universe. Fries' con-
tempora:ry, Schelling, had suggested deity to be the 11bond11 of the 
community. 1 Reason alone does not admit such a solution. In order 
to explain "all that is11 an existence distinct from it must be admitted. 
The idea of deity express~s this concept. 
If we propose definitely to unite all Being in 
the one and only Substance, Deity, then there is 
nothing outside God and everything is One. In that 
case, however, the subordination of the finite and 
eternal would be quite unthinkable .. In that case we 
cannot allow Appearance any reality in relation to 
the Eternal; Appearance itself would not even be 
possible as Illusion. For since all Being here is 
only the one and highest Being, the_re is nothing 
more that can appear. There is then to be found 
only what exists in itself, and thus no changing pic-
ture of Appearance is possible. 2 
The concept of deity explains not only the parts of the commu-
nity but also explains the cause of the community itself. Spinoza had 
suggestEfd the idea of deity could be reached from the idea of substance. 
Fries has shown that rather than the idea of deity~ the category of 
substance is capable of pointing to the idea of the soul. 3 
By ideal schematization of the categories it has been demon-
strated how Fries hoped to escape the limitations of the phenomenal 
world forever presented to us in a restricted manner. Beyond Wissen 
he has attempted to establish Glauben, the way of ideal knowledge 
through faith. It is only at this point that Fries feels justified in 
moving to the third form of knowledge. Within the concept of Ahndung 
are to be found the religious convictions rationally hinted at in the. cold 
L Otto, The Philosophy of Religion,_ p. 87. 
2. Jakob Fries, Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1807), p. 286, quoted in 
Otto, p. 90. 
3. Otto, Ibid. , p. 90. 
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metaphysical insights of Glauben. Also within this idea are to be found 
the power for moral endeavor. It is to the all-important idea of Ahn-
dung in Fries 1 thought that our attention is now turned. 
(8) Ahndung 
Otto suggests the elaborate philosophy~.~:. of Fries, moving from 
an examination of the phenomenal knowledge through the knowledge of 
the intel~ect, to the highest form of knowledge, Ahndung, is devoted to 
one prime end: 11 • • • to find a basis for the conviction already given 
1 by the first religious e;motion1 • 11 1 The centrality of religion in Fries' 
entire philosophical system is reflected in several random quotes se-
lected by Otto from Fries 1 writings. 
Religious convictions as to what we trust, though we be-
hold it not, cannot originate in sensuous contacts of our 
intellect. For they are from the beginning among pos-
sessions of reason and must exist with equal truth in 
every human intellect. 2 
The central point of our intellect is a limitless 
faith and everlasting love. It is through this faith and 
this pure love alone that everything that has life in it 
comes to the world before our eyes. From it springs 
in our inmost soul the single source of all our life. 
From this the Eternal reveals itself to the ordinary 
intelligence, and from this alone, in the vague feeling 
of respect for the worth of goodnesst in the vague 
feeling of satisfaction in the sublime and the beautiful, 
and, lastly, in the sense of majesty of religion. If we 
are to conceive the ideal of the highest good, when 
purest love and purest resp'ect are united in the senti-
ment of adoration~ then the most commonplace belief 
and the most subtle speculation are on equal footing. 
And similarly in every other matter of religion. 3 
1. Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 36>-37. 
2. Fries, Handbook of the Philosophy of Religion {1832), p. 15, 
quoted in Otto, p. 31. 
3. Fries,. Kritik, I, p: 386, quoted in Otto, pp. 32-33. 
The .following quotation reflects in poetic prose the ideas 
Fries has attempted to develop systematically in his critique of the 
reasoning intellect. 
And so at last the whole train of thought (of 
the mathematical and physical view of the universe) 
has nothing but physical importance~ For humanity 
it loses in the last resort, and just for the sake of 
its immensity~ all possible meaning, in the im-
measurability of its extensions in space and its 
lapses of time. Die, and in a moment thou art freed 
from time and space. But in the mind within thee 
there will vanish neither the beauty of the fields in 
blossom nor love in thy heart, nor- the everlasting 
love that embraces all. 1 
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Religion and metaphysics are basically antithetical in approach 
to a:J?.y knowledge of the reaL The former finds its basis in the char-
acter and the will while the latter expresses the insight of the reason. 
The two are not, however-, antithetical in content. A religion whose 
implicit metaphysical presuppositions are untenable cannot sustain it-
self. It is a firm conviction of this fact that has caused Fries to dwell 
at length upon natural philosophy. His expositions of Wissen and Glau-
ben have· been attempts to demonstrate the validity of each type of 
knowledge, but also the limitations of each.. Not until this has been 
done does he move on. The transition from the insights of logical 
judgment to those of esthetic judgment is made by means of the follow-
ing Friesian quotation., 
We distinguish Wissen;- Glauben and Ahnden as 
three distinct types of conviction~ entirely different 
from each other. Wissen means only the conviction 
of a complete knowledge, the objects of which are 
known through perception; Glaube, on the other hand, 
is the necessary conviction of pure reasonr which 
1. Frfes, History of Philosophy (1837 -1840), p. 357 .. quoted in 
Otto, p. 32. 
·can come into our consciousness only in concepts, 
that is, in ideas~ but Ahndung is a necessary con-
viction of pure feeling. 1 
The German word Ahndung has no precise English equivalent. 
E. B. Dicker.~ translator of Otto's Philosophy of Religion,. offers the 
following explanation. 2 
AHN)JNG.. . This term, peculiar to Fries and his 
folloyvers, cannot be rendered concisely in English. 
In its ordinary use it is 11the obscure prevision of 
some coming event, not based on clear grounds and 
merely felt. " In its technical sense, as found in this 
work, it is defined in German philosophical diction-
aries as follows: 
HThe sensation of states and connections, 
which are hidden from clear knowledge; a con-
viction that depends on feeling, without any 
definite conception" (Schmidt, Philosophisches 
Worterbuch). 
"Fries understands by Ahnung (Ahndung} a 
conviction originating in the feelings, without 
any definite conception, of the reality of the 
supra-sensual, which gives us a reflection of 
the real existence of things in their phenom-
ena, and brings us to their eternal meaning and 
purposeful connection, in Nature's sublimity 
and beauty" (Eisler, Handworterbuch der 
Philo sophie). 
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The concept of Glauben, as developed in Fr~es' thought, must 
be reexamined in the light of the idea of Ahndung. It was shown that 
Glauben was knowledge not obtained by "sight" but by "faith". But the 
ideas suggested by Glauben appear to be ideas without positive content"' 
The knowledge of Glaub en is the knowledge of ndouble negation". 3 
1. Fries, Wissen, Gl,auben, und Ahndung, pp. 63-64, quoted in David,.. 
son, p. 149. 
2. E. B. Dicker, "Translator's Notes," Otto, p. lL 
I 
3. Otto,. The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 131-132. 
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Examining the idea of soul as the spiritual meaning in the 
category of substance with the space-.time limitations removed it is 
seen that what remains is a spiritual entity to which no phenomenal 
attributes apply. Freedom is seen as the negation of rigid causal re-
striction on all phenomenal events. Freedom negates causality in the 
spiritual realm, but adds no positive content. Thirdly, ideas of deity, 
in a most convincing way, illustrate ideas obtained by negation of re-
strictions upon the intellect. Omnipotence is the conclusion of the 
thinking about a Being in whom limitations of power are denied. Om-
niscience suggests a negation of restrictions upon intellect. Omni ... 
presence and Eternal suggest the negation of space and time limita-
tions. If one hopes, therefore to find a positive basis of belief in 
Glauben he will be disappointed. 
The realization of the limitations upon Glauben knowledge leads 
to a recurring element in religion. The sources of this element may 
usually be obscure to the participant, yet the fact of its presenc·e he is 
powerfully aware of. This is the element of mystery in religion. otto 
considers this element of Fries 1 thought n. • . the most subtle and 
delicate thing in the whole Friesian philosophy. 111 
The necessary centrality of mystery in religion in Fries 1 
thought has important implications in his overall system. It admits 
that the assurance of religion,. the positive aspects of religious con-
viction, are not found in conc~ptual terms. The idea of Ahndung sug-
gests the intuitive awareness of truths suggested in the reasoning 
mind but never demonstrated by reason itself. The conviction of Ahn-
dung is nonconceptual, 11 • • • a necessary conviction of pure feeling. 11 2 
Within the insight of Ahndung there is certain, concrete, if 
1. Ibid. , p. 125. 
2. Fries, Wissen, Glauben and Ahndung, p. 64, quoted in.Davidson1 
p. 149. 
somewhat conceptually obscure conviction of the eternal fitness and 
purpose present in the finite; conditioning it and transcending it. 
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With the insights of Ahndung the negative conclusions reached 
by Glauben, viz,, soul, freedom, deity, receive power of conviction. 
The idea of soul as the substance of the world becomes filled 
with new meaning. Ahndung points to the positive value of the individ-
ual soul. Dimly apprehended is the important idea of the individual-
ity of each soul. The conviction of the dignity of human personality 
(Wi:l.rde der Person), as it exemplifies WQrth and purpose is given 
support. Fries derives from this insight, esthetic in nature, the 
dynamics of moral endeavor. Mere intellectual recognition of the 
worth of the person is never enough to supply the moral imperative; 
rather, the conviction of feeling itself, as it dimly recognizes tran-
scendent worth in every finite human creature, supplies the uncondi-
tional character of the moral imperative. It is to be noted that while 
Kant made religion subservient to the realm of morality, Fries has 
turned the situation around. The dynamic for morality comes from an 
esthetic Ahndung of purpose and worth which itself in its highest form 
is religion. 
How does the intuitive awareness of the dignity of personality 
and the idea of soul make itself felt religiously? By enthusiasm. 
Thus it is that the frenzy of some religious rites;.- often the complete 
aban~on in dancet etc., is a reflection of the feeling of exaltation~ as 
man apprehends dimly and often non-conceptually, to be sure, his own 
worth and a meaning for his existence. Fries suggests that this 
awareness gives rise to the life of piety and provides its power. 
The idea of freedom, when interpreted in the light of Ahndung 
acquires positive content. One of the convictions of mankind, most 
frequently quoted by moralists and ethical theorists is the feeling that 
man has of his own freedom. Its existence was given metaphysical 
56 
support in Fries 1 insights of Glaub en. But its power of conviction 
stems from an intuitive awareness in Ahndung. While mankind is 
aware of being able to act on the basis of freedom according to his 
own will, he is equally aware of not doing so. He is sure that his 
actions are his own~ for which he is ultimately responsible. The fol-
lowing quotation of Fries shows his method of evoking this awareness 
in another. 
If anybody says~o how can I help it that I have by birth 
and education become the man I am,_ he is to be an-
swered; if you were not this sort of man in your in-
telligible character, you could never have manifested 
yourself in this sort of life. The necessary inter-
-catenation of events in Nature which manifests you in 
Nature only belongs to the form in which you become 
self-conscious of your own actions. The acts them-
selves are free acts of your intelligible character. 1 
The result of the recognition by the individual that he has failed 
to live up to what he has felt to be best produces self-surrender. lt is 
the intuitive awareness of this mysterious aspect of man 1 s character 
that has given birth to recurring ideas of Original Sin, Fall of man, 
etc. 
Just as with our idea of soul) the developed awareness of our 
own freedom leads us, in self-surrender, to the life of piety. Piety 
then becomes the dynamic awareness of our freedom and sin. 
What is the positive content of the idea of deity? Again~ 
deeper than conceptual statement there exists the feeling that this is 
the world of God. Ideas of His sustaining and purposive direction 
seem not only reasonable, but necessary~ Deity is felt to be " ... 
God; the absolutely holy and omnipotent goodness;, which as a creator 
fixes and determines the 1 highest good' , the eternal world, as 1 the 
1. Fries, Kritik1 IT, p. 259~ quoted in otto, p. 127. 
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best world' in accordance with eternal value and aim. 111 
Intuitive awareness of the Absolute Goodness of God produces 
the third positive element leading to the life of piety, viz., devotion. 
(9) The Beautiful and the Sublime 
To the ideas of self-surrender,. enthusiasmt devotion Fries 
gives the name esthetic judgments. Such judgments are to be con-
trasted with the logical judgments of reason. They are, however, of 
much greater significance because of what they imply. otto indicates 
the Platonic flavor of Fries 1 use of Ahndung at many points in his 
(Fries') philosophy. The arousing or awakening of the feelings is 
Plato's rtanamnesis". ';rhe insight of Ahndung is an idea "brought to 
remembrance. 112 Fries would imply that our participation with the 
creator of the world is demonstrable. Through the avenue of intui-
tion are grasped obscurely the ideas of the source of our being. In 
Ahndung glimpses are obtained as to the meaning of our existence~ 
Otto writes, 
If the spirit of man is really a citizen of God's eter-
nal world, an organic part of the community of the 
highest good, the common body in which everything 
possesses eternal value and everything is conform-
able to the highest purpose . .. . then, if the spirit of 
man encounters in Nature something of this supreme" 
incomprehensible fitness.~ this process of "recollec-
tion" is bound to come to life in him by means of a 
harmony determined through principles that the mind 
itself fails to comprehend, by means of feelings of 
particular satisfaction. And the clearly defined realm 
of this 11Ahnen 11 aroused through a particular satisfac-
tion is the realm of the sublime and the beautiful. 3 
l. Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 129. 
2. Ibid., p. 135. 
3. Ibid. I p. 138-139. 
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The meaning of beauty as the instrument of Ahndung is broad 
in scope. The beautiful is experienced on the simple level of a flow-
er in the world. It persists as taste and sensitivity lead to the dis-
covery of its existence in higher and more complex modes of being, 
finding its highest expression in spiritual beauty. To illustrate, one 
even distinguishes between "physical beauty" and nspiritual beauty". 
But what is it in the feeling that is the beautiful? What remains when 
the realm in which the beautiful is experienced is delineated? By way 
of Ahndung one gains an insight into a harmony, a unity, out of ~he 
multiplex which is perceived. In pronouncing something beautiful the 
participant ascribes an objective element to the forms as experienced 
and claims to have an obscure " ... comprehension of its teleology. 111 
At the highest level the intuition of the unity behind the form, 
of an objective value and purpose which are imparted at the meeting, 
leads one's thoughts to the creator. Something of the reason why the 
creator calls things into being is recognized. 11I cannot state in con-
ceptual form this value which the Beautiful possesses in itself. But I 
feel it and I acquiesce in it freely. " 2 
If something of the objective teleology of the world is presented 
in the experience of the beautiful, it is presented with even greater 
clarity in experiences of the sublime. 
Just as with ideas of the beautiful, the ideas of the sublime are 
apprehended on different levels. In the 11mathematicallyn sublime the 
idea of spatial magnitude overpowers us: "a lofty cathedral, a beetling 
cliff~ the illimitable ocean, the vault of heaven. "3 Spatial sublimity 
implies that the limit of one 1 s powers of comprehension have been 
1. Ibid. ' p. 141. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. , p. 142. 
0 
0 
59 
reached. What is then felt is the idea of absolute greatness, or com-
pleteness. Spiritual sublimity reaches the greatest heights. In the 
" .•. greatness of the soul, heroismr undauntedness, in action from 
a sense of duty, and with it all that is sublime in the history and des-
tiny of man and nations, n1 the relation between the finite and the in-
finite is experienced. 
Fries 1 threefold knowledge has led to Ahndung. Religious 
feeling has been characterized as the most significant expression of 
a judgment esthetic in character. While the assurances of Ahndung 
have seemed to give assurance to the restricted knowledge of the 
phenomenal world and the negations of pure reason, its content has 
not been in conceptual terms. Any attempts to ~ranscend the insights 
of Ahndung and present conceptual statements of religious knowledge 
are, for Fries, impossible. The limitations of Wissen and Glauben 
must be kept in mind. By analogy and symbol the convictions of re--
ligion find expression beyond the realm of feeling. In the entire sys-
tem of Fries it must be kept in mind that nReligion is concerned with 
the spiritual realities shrouded in ultimate and irresolvable mystery 
for the finite mind, yet in some way immediately apprehended in intu-
ition and feeling, and acknowledged in moral ideal and conduct. n 2 
1. Ibid. , p. 143. 
2. Davidson, p. 153. 
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4. Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) 
Otto' s relation to Ritschl is problematic.. Due to the great in-
fluence of Ritschl on German theology during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century it is certain that Otto's early theological training 
included comprehensive .studies of Ritschl.. The early twentieth cen-
tury, howev~r, saw a reaction to Ritchlian theology. So it is that otto 
.refers to Ritschl only three times in The .ldea of the Holy1 and in each 
place it' is to criticize hi:m. 
Davidson believes that Otto is more dependent upon Ritsch11 s 
insights than he admits. 2 He contend~ that the inspiration for otto's 
formulation of the Holy as a category of value is an alteration of 
Ritsch11 s contention that religious faith is a unique value. 
Dillenbergerr on the other hand, criticizes Davidson 1 s inter-
pretation stating that on the nature of religion otto is di·a:metrically 
opposed to Ritschl who for the most part follows Kant's Critique of 
Practical Reason. 3 
Davidson may contend that Otto 1 s formulation of the centrality 
of religious valuation is derived chiefly from Ritschl. However~ our 
study of Fries has shown that he character.izes the positive aspects of 
Ahndung as an apprehension of a unique value. This would lead one to 
conclude that while otto must of necessity have been greatly influenced 
by Ritschlian theology his utilization of it in his own philosophy of re-
ligion is not as straightforward as Davidson would have us believe. 
1* Otto~ The Idea of the Holy, pp. 18, 541 92 .. 
2~ Da'Vids0n~:-p-;, q·5 .. ,. :! • 
3. Dillenberger~ p. 71. 
5. Ernst Troelts ch 
Mention will now be made of Ernst Troeltsch who was a 
colleague of Otto 1 s on the .faculty at GottingenL 
Troeltsch uses the phrase religious Ap:dori before otto de-.. 
velops the idea., Davidson notes that otto "viewed with alarmrt the 
enthusiasm aroused by this theory. The indications are" however, 
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he further notes~ that O:l:to' s own later formulation of this idea demon-
E;trates a clear influence of Troeltsch. 1 
1. Davidson, p .. 48, 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
A. Introduction 
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The objective of this chapter is to explore the methodology of 
Rudolf Otto's philosophy of religion. It will concentrate on the ep;i.s-
temological structure which Otto believes best interprets the fact of 
religion. In addition it will examine the particular concepts which are 
crucial to an understanding of otto's theory of religion. 
The category of the holy will be examined in detail. Its vari-
ous elements, as suggested by Otto, will be isolated. Otto's synthe-
sis of these factors will then be offered with any shortcomings which 
the system is felt to be noted. 
Also included in the chapter will be Otto's modifications of the 
thought of the theological figures which were discussed in Chapter II. 
Special notice will be made of his modification of the thought of 
Schleiermacher and Fries. 
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B. The Autonomy of Religion 
The central element of Rudolf otto 1 s approach to religion is 
an insistence upon the autonomy of the religion in human experience. 1 
otto's extensive acquaintance with world religions tended to confirm 
the fact that religion cannot be adequately explained in terms of some 
other spiritual function. The writing of The Idea of the Holy must be 
viewed as an effort to delineate the elements in religion which contri-
bute to its distinctive independent character. 
An excellent sk?tch of the history of religion in modern times 
is given by Paul Tillich in Theology of Culture. 2 It will be referred 
to at this time because it points up alternative solutions to the prob-
lem otto is attacking and serves to introduce otto's own point of view. 
In this essay by Professor Tillich 3 he describes the odyssey of 
religion as it attempts to 11find a home 11 within man 1 s spiritual func-
tions. Religion first comes to the moral function of the human spirit. 
Are not the ethical and the religious the nearest relatives within the 
totality of man? Morality is described as accepting religion. But re-
ligion must be the servant, the "poor relation". As long as religion 
helps to 11create good citizens, good husbands and children, good em-
ployees, officials, and soldiers, " 4 it is allowed to remain. When~ 
1. J. Boozer, 11Biblical Understanding of Religious Experience,-" 
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXVI.( October, 19 58), 291-9 7; 
Davidson, op.- cit., p. 11; Dillenberger, op. cit. , p. 70; Mircea ' 
Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961). First published in 
French, 1956. 
2. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 6-7. 
3. This essay originally appeared in an altered form as Man's Right 
to Knowledge, 2nd Ser., Columbia University Press, 1954. 
4. Ibid. ' p. 6. 
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however.r it makes claims of its own it is silenced or discarded. Can 
we not see this process in the sublime writings of Kant's Second 
Critique ? 1 
Next religion goes to the cognitive function of man 1 s spiritual 
life. "Religion as a special way of knowledge, as mythological imag-
ination or as mystical intuition ..• " 2 is suggested. But again reli-
gious knowledge is contrasted with pure knowle.dge and must be ac-
cepted as subordinate. It is submitted that Hegel's philosophical 
system illustrates the locating of religion within the intellectual func-
tion of'man. 
Again religion is without a home. It turns to the esthetic 
function of man. Art welcomes religion and happily acknowledges that 
all art can indeed be viewed as religion. Here religion must again 
hesitate. It is suggested that Jakob Fries 1 3 efforts to designate re-
ligion as the highest insight essentially esthetic in nature may be 
placed in this general category. 
Where is religion to find a home? It turns to something that 
accompanies every activity of man, viz., feeling. Religion is feeling. 
But, Dr. Tillich states, 11Religion~ if banished to the realm of mere 
feeling has ceased to be dangerous ... it has also lost its seriousness, 
its truth, and its ultimate meaning." 4 The efforts of Schleiermacher 
would seem to fall in the category just described. 
In the light of this historical description it is felt that the 
1. Notet the specific examples offered in this reference to Dr. Til-
lich' s thought were not offered in the work cited. They were, 
however, mentioned in a Spring, 1962 Lecture Series in Philos-
ophy of Religion by Professor Tillich. 
2. Tillich, op. cit. , p. 6. 
3. Fries was not specifically mentioned by Dr. Tillich. 
4. Tillich,_ op. cit. , p. 7. 
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efforts of Otto assume significance. Religion~ he will contend, must 
not be considered as one part, even though it be the highest part, of 
any of man's other spiritual functions. Religion, with specific ref-
erence to its peculiar 11numen, 11 is perfectly sui generis. 
0 
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C. The Category of the Holy 
1. The Numinous 
a) Introduction 
The nature and the extent of the sphere of religion is explained 
by otto in terms of the Holy. He regards the Holy as a category of 
interpretation and· value.. It contains various elements which;- to make 
the nature ofthe category clear, one must if?olate. The category con-
tains the product of mant s rational endeavor. Inconsistencies in theo-
logical formulations are gradually removed because of these rational 
elements. The manner in which otto believes the insights of the ra .. 
tional function of man are incorporated in the complex category of the 
holy will be discussed later in this chapter. The immediate task, and 
one which otto considers fundamental, is that of isolating another 
element of the category of the Holy. This element he calls the nmo-
ment 11 of religion and his characterization of it is 11the·-nonrational. 11 
b) The Non ... rational 
The sub-title of The Idea of the Holy is given as "An Inquiry 
into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to 
the rational. 11 Therefore, while this entire study, including the exten-
sive phenomenological descriptions of chapter IV is an attempt to 
illustrate the idea of the non-rational, a preliminary explanation of the 
term must be offered as a point of reference. In this regard otto 
states: 
The words 1 non-rational' and irrational are 
today used almost at random. The non-rational is 
sought over the most widely different regions, and 
writers generally shirk the trouble of putting down 
exactly what they intend by the term, giving it often 
the most multifarious meanings or applying it with 
such vague generality that'it admits the most diverse 
interpretations. Pure fact in contrast to law, the 
empirical in contrast to reason, the contingent in 
contrast to the necessary; the psychological in con-
trast to transcendental fact, that which is known a 
posteriori in contrast to :that which is determinable 
a priori; power_,. will, and arbitrary choice in con-
trast to reason, knowledge, and determination by 
value; impulse, instinct, and the obscure forces of the 
subconscious in contrast to insight, reflection, and 
intelligible plan; mystical depths and stirrings in the 
soul, surmise, presentiment, intuition1 prophecy, 
and finally the 1 occult' powers also; or, in general, 
the uneasy stress and universal fermentation of the 
time,. with its groping after the thing never yet heard 
or seen in poetry or the plastic arts . • • Whoever 
makes use of the word 1 non-ra:tional' today ought to 
say what he actual,ly means by it. This we did in our 
introductory chapter. We began with the 1 rational' 
in the idea of God and the divine; 1 meaning by the 
term that in it which is clearly to be grasped by our 
power of conceiving, and enters the domain of famil-
iar and definable conceptions. We went on to maintain 
that beneath this sphere of clarity and lucidity lies a 
hidden depth~ inaccessible to our conceptual thought, 
which we in so fa.r call the 1 non-rational'. 2 
c) Otto's Designation of the Non-rational 
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For what he hopes is the sake of clarity Otto defines the non,.. 
rational element of the category of the Holy by a special term. He 
notes that from the Latin omen is obtained the word ominous. There-
1. Otto is anxious not to be interpreted as advocating irrationalism. 
His insistence upon this fact can be detected in the general tone 
of this quotation. Further, he leaves no doubt about his attitude 
toward the subject of the non-rational in the foreword to the first 
English edition of The Idea of the Holy. Here he says, "In this 
book I have ventured to write of that which may be called 1 non-
rational' or 1 supra-rational' in the depths of the divine nature. 
I do not thereby want to promote in any way the tendency of our 
time towards an extravagant and fantastic 1 irrationalism 1 , but 
2. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 58-59. 
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fore from the Latin numen let us coin the term numinous. He adds 1. 
HI shall speak then of a up.ique 1 numinous' category of value and of a 
definitely 1 numinous' state of mind~ which is always found wherever 
the category is applied. 11 1 
d) Elements of the Numinous 
It will be helpful to deal separately with the various aspects of 
the numinous. The capacity to experience the holy will be suggested 
as an~ priori faculty of man. On the one hand, the subjective side of 
the numinous will be explained as a feeling, peculiar to this .religious 
faculty of man. The objective ~ide of the numinous, on the other hand, 
will be insisted upon as well. In addition,. the numinous experience 
will be c~aimed to convey a unique valuation distinguishing it from a 
sheert indeterminate feeling. 
(1) The Religious ~priori 
Just as beauty will only make an impression on the man who 
possesses the potentiality of esthetic valuation·, so, otto suggests, 
the Holy is only received because mankind possesses the faculty to 
receive it and value it. 2 While, however, this ability is due to 
11 a purely~ priori category," 3 i~ is not everywhere recognizable 
rather to join issue with it in its morbid form.. The 1 irrational' 
is today a favorite theme of all who are too lazy to think or too 
ready to evade the arduous duty of clarifying their ideas and 
grounding their convictions on a basis of inherent thought. This 
book~ recognizing the profound impact of the non-rational for 
metaphysic,;- makes a serious attempt to analyze all the more 
exactly the feeling which remains where the concept fails, and 
to introduce a terminology which is not any more loose or inde-
terminate for having necessarily to make use of symbols. 11 Otto, 
The Idea of the Holy, ForewQrd, p. xxi. 
1. lbld. ,, p. 7. 
2. Ibid. ' p. 160, 162. 
3. Ibid. ' p. 112. 
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in mankind. Some men are not religious and show no desire to be so. 
This, otto suggests, points up the distinction between a priori and 
innate cognitions. The concept of an ~priori category· suggests that 
all men possess the predisposition to religious values, but not the 
capacity to produce them themselves. This can only be done by one 
possessing what he terms the power of ndivinationn. 1 
It is clear that otto desires tha~ the concept of the religious 
~priori be understood in basically the same sense as the Kantian a 
priori categories, for he states, ''The ideas of the numinous and the 
feelings that correspond to them are~' quite as much as the rational 
ideas and feelings~ absolutely 1 pure',_ and the criteria which Kant 
suggests for the 1 pure 1 concept and the 1 pure t feeling of respect are 
most precisely applicable to them. 112 However, he also wishes to 
make this category in a def;i.nite sense more profound, more basic 
than even the Kantian categories. For example, he asserts, 
The facts of the numinous consciousness point there-
fore - as likewise do the 1 pure concepts of the under-
standing of Kant and the ideas and value-judgements 
of ethics or aesthetics - to a hidden substantive source) 
from which the religious iaeas and feelings are formed, 
which lies in the mind independently of s ens e-experi-. 
ence; a 1 pure reason' in the profoundest sense, which, 
because of the ' surpassingness 1 of its content, mjrst be 
distinguished from both the pure theoretical and the 
pure practical reason of Kant, as something yet higher 
or deeper than they. 3 
The a priori category of the Holy, which otto elsewhere de-
scribes as, nThis spirit, this inborn capacity to receive and under-
1. Ibid. , p. 177 ~ 
2. Ibid., p. 112. 
3. Ibid. , p. 113-114. 
stand .. : , 11 1 leads to a depth in man more profound than man' s 
rational faculties can comprehend. 
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At this point it is helpful to recall Fries' doctrine of Ahndungr 
The insights of Ahndung were the highest form of esthetic insight.-
'l'hey were, however, the possessions of feeling and could not be con-
ceptually expressed. 
On the basis of this insight Otto suggests that the statements 
ofthe mystics; often criticized as unintelligible assume new meaning. 
Above and beyond our rational being lies hidden the 
ultimate and highest part of our nature,._ which can 
find"no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the needs 
of our sensuousf psychical, or intellectual impulses 
;~~~:t:!~f:~ s!~~ 2mystics called it the basis or 
Elsewhere he says~ 
hi the case of the non-rational elements of our cate-
gory of the Holy we are referred back to something 
still deeper than the 1 pure reason' ~ at least as this 
is usually understood, namely to that which mysti-
cism has rightly na;rned the fundus animae,. the 3 
'bottom' or 1 ground of the soul' {Seelengrund). 
What is the basis of confirmation of this insight? How is one 
to become aware of the a priori category of the holy? Otto's an-
swer is reminiscent of Schleiermacher who had stated, 
1. 
2 .. 
3. 
4. 
I must direct you to your own selves. You must 
apprehend a living moment. You must know how 
to listen to yourselves before your 'OWn conscious-
ness. 4 
Ibid. , p. 61. 
Ibid. ' p. 36. 
Ibid.' p. 112. 
Schleiermacher, Addresses, p. 41. 
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Similarly, Otto states it is by the method of introspection that 
the insights he is suggesting are either confirmed or denied. 1 To the 
individual who denies this deep felt experience otto admits he has 
l.ittle more to say for ". . . it is not easy to discuss questions of re-
ligious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his 
adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, 
but cannot recall any intrinsically rellgious feelings. u 2 
It must be added, however, that co;ntrary to what Otto here 
states, his persistent contention for the predisposition of man to re ... 
ligion as .an a priori element in his nature suggests that he is willing 
to give no "unbelieverJt up. The awareness of the Holy may be evoked 
by one gifted with the faculty of divination. 3 Otto' s entire phenomen ... 
ological descript~on of the numinous, by the use of symbols, is an 
4 
attempt to evoke such an awareness. 
(2) Two aspects of ~he numinous 
(a) The Response. - otto clearly outlines two distinct aspects of 
' 
the numinous. First,. it is to be regarded as a unique feeling. This 
represen~s the subjective side of the numinous. Secondly, it is to be 
regarded as an object to whiqh the feeling refers. This represents 
the objective side. 
We have considered 1 the holy' on the one hand as an 
a priori category of the rriind, and on the other hand 
as manifesting itself in outward appearance. 5 
1. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 113. 
2. Ibid. ' p. 8. 
3'" lbid. , p. 177 .. 
4. Ibid. ' p. 12. 
5. Ibid., p. 174. The developiD;ent of the ideas implied in the phrase 
11outward appearancett will be given in Chapter IV. 
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Otto makes it abundantly clear that the manifestation of the numinous 
is a feeling experience. Since the numinous affects us on a level 
deeper even than our rational faculties the experience is non-rational, 
i.e., incapable of precise conceptualization. The documentation of 
this point follows r 
Speaking of the numinous feeling he says~ 11It cannot be ex-
pressed by means of anything else, just because it is so pri;mary and 
elementary a datum in our psychical life;, and therefore only definable 
through itself. 111 Elsewhere he states; 11Not the most concentrated 
attention can elucidate the object to which this state of mind refers, 
bringing it out of the obscurity of feeling into the domain of the con-
ceptual understanding. It. remains purely a felt experience ..• 112 
Continuing discussion of this point Otto notes that a particular 
numinous experience may remain in the realm .of feeling without ~ 
having been schematized by concept. 11The mental state we ·are dis-
cussing, 11 he notes, "may, on the one hand~ remain pure 1 feeling' f 
pursue .its course,. and pass away without its obscure thought-content 
being rendered explicit." 3 But because the experience of the numin-
ous is one of feeling, not capable of being precisely known conceptu-
~lly, otto cautions us. against confusing inconceivability with unknow-
ableness. 
1 Revelation' does not mean a mere passing over into 
the intelligible and comprehensible. Something may 
be profoundly a;nd intimately known in feeling for the 
bliss it brings or the agitation it produces, and yet 
the understanding may find no concept for it. To 
know and to understand conceptually are two different 
things, are often even mutually exclusive and con-
1. Ibid. I p. 9. 
2. Ibid.' p. 59. 
3, Ibid., p. 126. 
trasted. The mysterious obscur.ity of the numen 
is by no means tantamount to unknowableness. 
Assuredly the 1 deus absconditus et incomprehen-
sibllis' was fo;r' Luther no 'deus ignotus'. And so~ 
too1 St. Paul 1 knows' the peace, which yet 1 pass-
eth understanding' . 1 
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otto' s conclusion that the numinous feeling is deeper than the 
pure reason and therefore resists precise conceptualization leads him 
to a critique of Schleiermacher. While otto agrees with Schleier-
macher' s isolation of a unique and religious feel.ing> 2 he is critical of 
the concept Schleierm.acher chooses to portray it. While he does not 
do so in his Addresses, Schleiermacher is led in his later, more sys-
i:ematicj works to identify the religious feeling as a "feeling of abso-
3 lute depe;ndence. n 
Otto objects to this expression. Schleiermacher, he feels, 
has given a conceptual explanation of the matter. Since the feeling in 
question is held by otto t.o be de.eper than the level of concept, Schleier-
macher' s formulation is clearly unacceptable.- "Everything turns upon 
the character of i:his overpowe;dng might, 11 Otto states,_ 11a character 
which cannot be expressed verbally, and can only be suggested in-
directly through the tone and content of a man' s feeling-response to 
't n4 l • 
What is the content of the feeling of the numinous ? otto asserts 
it is an elementary datum completely separable and distinguishable 
from all the other feelings of which man is capable. 
1. Ibid.,, p. 135. Emphasis mine. 
2. Ibid. ' p. 9. 
3. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Eng. trans. , Edinburgh, 
1928}, p. 12. 
4. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 10. 
Now it is just the same with the feeling of the nu ... 
menous as with that of moral obligation. lt too [the 
feeling of the numinous] is not to be derived from 
any other feeling, and is in this sense 1 unevolvable 1• 
lt is a content of feeling that is qualitatively sui 
generis~ yet at the same time one that has numer-
ous analogies with others, and therefore they may 
reciprocally excite or stimulate one another and 
cause one another to appear in the mind. 1 
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(b) The Referent. - In addition to the feeling of the numinous being 
completely sui gene):'is it is also characterized by a positive valua-
tion. This point assumes significant proportions in Otto 1 s complete 
theory of religion. ln exploring it the transition fro:rn the concept of 
numinous feeling to that of numinous referent. is made. 
The quality of value, otto observes, "is an immediate datum 
given with the feeling of th~ numen ..• 11 2 In the rrmoment" of this 
experie;nce the creature 
.... passes upon the numen a judgement of appreci-
ation of a unique kind by the category diametrically 
contrary to 1 the profane', the category I holy'l 
which is proper to the nu,men alone~ but to it in an 
absolute degree; he says~ 1 Tu solus sanctus' .. 
This 'sanctus' is not merely 1 perfect' or 1 beau-
tiful' or 1 sublime 1 or 1 good 1 t- though, being like 
these concepts also a valuet objective and ultimate, 
it has a definite, percept-ible analogy with them. It 
is the positive numinous value or worth, and to it 
corresponds on the side of the creature a numinous 
dis value or 1 unw.orth 1 .. 3 
In another passage Otto suggests the same idea; however, in 
this passage the striking similarity to Fr~es 1 characterization of 
1 .. Ibid. , P· 44. 
--
2. lbid.' p. 50. 
3. Ibid.' P· 51. 
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Ahndung with its. positive feeling content is unmistakable. Again he 
asserts that words cannot express the depths of the numinous feeling. 
But though what is enunciated 1n the word is nega-
tive, what is meant is something absolutely and in-
tensely positive. This pure positive we can experi-
ence in feelings~ feelings which ou~ discussion can 
help to make clear to us~ in so far as it arouses 
them actually in our hearts. 1 
The apprehension of numinous value which otto terms H ••• a ' 
value1 precious beyond all conceiving, " 
2 is the basis for the doctrine 
of sin and atonement. 3 The meaning of sin must not be explained in 
terms of moral transgression. It cannot be such since it stems from 
the numinous category which he has clearly distinguished from 
morality. 
lt does no± spring from the consciousness of some 
·committed t;rans.gression, but rather is an immedi-
ate datum given with the feeling of the numen• it 
proceeds to 1 disvalue' together with the self the 
tribe to which the person belongs, and indeed,. to-
gether with that, all existence in general. 4 . 
As a prime example of a record of such an experience Otto 
suggests Isaiah's vision (ISA. 6. ). 
If the experience of the numinous worth leads to the profound 
recognition of sin'" it also makes the creature acutely aware of the 
1. lbid. , p. 13. 
2. Ibid.' pp. 51-52. 
3. otto is not suggesting here that the doctrines of sin and atonement 
are other than conceptual s.ta~ements themselves. This he recog-
nizes. The point he wishes to emphasize is that the intuitions 
which give rise to these doctrines do not stem from any other than 
the numinous consciousness itself, cf. The Idea of the Holy, 
pp. 52-57. 
4. Ibid. z p. 50. 
need for a covering. 
'Atonement', following our view; is a 'sheltering' 
or 1 covering' ,~ but a profounder form of it. It 
springs directly from the idea of numinous value 
and worth or numinous disvalue or unworth as soon 
as these have been developed. Mere awe . . • has. 
here been elevated to the feeling that man in his 
'profanemess' is not worthy to stand in the presence 
of the holy one,. and that his own entire personal 
unworthiness. might defile even holiness itself. 1 
Otto's. insistence upon the objective side of the numinous 
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leads him to the symbolization of God as the "wholly other" the con-
sciousness. of which "evades precise formulation in words, and 
forcing one to employ symbolic phrases which seem sometimes sheer 
paradox." 2 While the discussion of the particular symbol, the 
"wholly other", will be deferred to Chapter IV, additional illustra-
tions of the objective side of the numinous experience are offered at 
this time·. 
Early in The Xdea of the Holy Otto makes it clear that he means 
to avoid a mere subjectivism with his development of the element of 
feeling. He states~ 
For the 'creature-feeling' and the sense of 
dependence to arise in the mind the ' numen 1 must 
be experienced as present, a numen praesens; as 
in, the case of Abraham. 3 There must be felt a 
something 1 numinous', something bearing the 
character of a 1 numen 1 'i to- which the mind turns 
1. Ibid. , p. 54. In addition to the example of Tsaiah, Otto cites also 
the centurion of Capernaum (Luke 7:1-10). 
2. Ibid. 1 p. 59. Als.o Dlllenberger, pp. 70-<99. Chapter III, "God 
Revealed as the Wholly Other. " 
3. When Abraham ventures to plead with God for the inhabitants of 
Sodomt he says, "Behold now,. I have taken on me to speak unto 
the Lord1 which am but dust and ashes (Gen. 18:27) .. " 
0 
spontaneously; or (which is the same· thing in other 
words) these feelings can only arise in the mind as 
accompanying emotions when the category of·' the 
numinous' is called into play. 
The numinous is thus felt as objective and 
outside the self. 1 
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Otto cites William James' Varieties of Religious Experience 
as supporting the fact of the objective nature of the numinous. He 
states that James' empiricist and pragmatist orientation prevents 
him from recognizing the "faculties of knowledge and the potentialities 
of thought in the spirit. But James grasps the fact and is led to con-
clude, "But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion 
something like thiS.t lt is as if there were in the human conscious-
ness a sense of reality, ~feeling of objective presence,. a perception 
of what we may call 1 something there'~ more deep and more general 
than any of the special and particular 1 senses' by which the current 
psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. 112 
As a peerless example of the fact James has just described 
Otto quotes a specific instance .. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
.. 
James had such an incident in mind when he made the above state-
ment. One is asked to note the claim for the objective nature of the 
numinous experience. 
The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by a 
solemn silence. The darkness held a presence that 
was all the more felt because it was not seen. I 
could not any more have doubted that He was there 
than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possi-
ble, the less real ofthe two. 3 ·' 
1. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 11 .. 
2. William James., Varieties of Religious Experience (New Yorkr 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925. ), p. 61. 
3. James, p. 67. Cited by Otto, The Idea of the Holy; pp. 22.,..23. 
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The numinous as it is described by otto is always to be viewed 
from the two perspectives which have been isolated. An emphasis on 
the affective aspect of the numinous must always be modified by his 
de$cription of its objective nature. The feeling of the numinous must 
be regarded not as equivalent to an emotion but as a form of aware-
ness. The awareness,. however, points to an object beyond the sub-
ject. T.o neglect either element of the numinous in relating the 
thought of otto is to do him an injustice;, for the passages which have 
been cited illustrate his e;xplicit opinions on the complementary as ... 
pects of the numinous. 
2. Schematization of the Category of the Holy 
a) A Criterion of Religion 
The discusfdon in this chapter has focused upon Otto's char-
acterization of the non-rational element of the category of the Holy. 
Otto, like Schleiermacher,. speaks a corrective word to those who 
would tend to identify religion with moralism or rationalism. Even 
Fries~ Otto feels, in the last analysis falls into a 11rationalistic 11 
e;ror in his explanation of religion as a phenomenon of history. 1 
79 
But while he insists upon the non-rational element as the basis 
of religion, it is clear that he does not wish to exclude rational in-
sights:. In fact, it is the degree to which a religion successfully com-
bines rational wHh non-rational elements which serves, in his opin-
ion,. as a criterion of its valuation~ 
·By the continual living activity of its non-rational 
elements a religion ~s guarded from passing into 
' rationalism' . By being steeped in and saturated 
with rational elements it is guarded from sinking 
into fanaticism or mere mysticality, or at least 
from persisting in these, and is qualified to become 
a religion for all civilized humanity. The degree in 
which both rational and non-rational elements are 
jointly present, united in healthy and lovely harmony, 
affords a criterion to measure the relative rank of 
religions ... and one, too, that is specifically 
religious .. 2 
1. otto~ Philosophy of Religion~ p. 145. 
2.. ott:ot The Idea of the Holy, pp. 141-142. Emphasis mine. Apply-
ing this criterion otto is led to conclude1- nchristianity~ in this and 
other respects, stands out in complete superiority over all its sis-
ter religions. The lucid edifice of its clear and pure conceptions, 
feelings, and experiences is built up on a foundation that goes far 
deeper than the rational. Yet the non-rational is only the basis.;. 
the setting, the woof in the fabric, ever preserving for Christi-
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b) The Process of Interpenetration 
The category of the Holy is to be regarded as 11 a com-
bined, complex category, the combining elements being its rational 
and non-rational components. nl The process of interpenetration of 
these two elements is one of schematization.. The rational elements 
schematize the non-rational. Once again otto depends upon a Kantian 
concept. 
Kant, he notes, had exemplified as an inner ~priori prfuciple 
the connection of the category of causality with its temporal 11>'3chema'~ 
A temporal sequence of two successive events when brought into con-
nection with the category of causality is then recognized as a causal 
relation. In this case the temporal sequence schematized the category. 
HNow the relation of the rational to the non-rational element in the 
idea of the holy or sacred is just such a one of 1 schematization'. 112 
The non-rational numinous fact. is that which is schematized 
by the rational concept. The result is the complex category of the 
Holy. 
otto is led to speculate that it is highly possible that the cate..._ 
gory of the Holy is also schematized by the feelings of 'the sublime. 1 
He bases this conclu$ion on the 11 ••• inward and lasting character of 
,. the connection in all the higher religions ••. 11 3 While otto' s study of 
anity its mystical depth, giving religion thereby the deep under-
tones and heavy shadows of mysticism without letting it develop 
into a mere rank growth of mysticality. And thus Christianity, 
in the healthily proportioned union of its elements, assumes an 
absolutely classical form and dignity} which is only the more 
vividly attested in consciousness as we proceed honestly and 
without prejudice to set it in its place in the comparative study 
of religions. 11 Ibid. , p"' 142. 
1. Ibid. ' p. 112. 
2. Ibid. ' p. 45. 
3. Ibid. ,. p. 46. 
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religions may have led him to this conclusion,. he does not success-
fully develop the concept within the general discussion of schematiza-
tion. As a result the attempt to include "the sublime 11 in the category 
of the Holy is unconvincing and appears more in the nature of an after-
thought. In general it weakens rather than strengthens his character-
ization of the category of the Holy. 
On the whole it is felt that Otto's case for the schematization 
of the numinous is the weakest specific concept in his system. This 
fact is further emphasized by an attempt in Chapter XVII to bring the 
rational and non-rational elements of the category of the Holy into 
closer relation. 
First it is stated that the rational and non-rational elements of 
the category are a priori elements, and both in the same degree. 1 
Then Otto is led to state~. 
But the same a priori character belongs in the third place, 
to the connexion of the rational and the non ... rational 
elements in re;I.igion~ in their inward and necessary 
union. The histories of religion recount indeed, as 
though it were something axiomatic-t the gradual in .... 
terpi:metration of the two; the process by which ' the 
divine is charged and filled out with ethical meaning. 
And this process is_, in factt felt as something axi-
omatict something whose inner necessity we feel to 
be self-evident. But then this inward self-evidence 
is a problem in itself; we are forced to assume an 
obscure, a priori knowledge of the necessity of this 
synthesis;.-combining ration~l and non,..rational. 2 
The reason for the preceding assertion appears somewhat 
puzzling. It adds nothing to his case for schematization. It may be 
the attempt on the part of Otto to integrate the non .... rational basis of 
religion w;ith the entire structure of man's spiritual activities. 
1. Ibid., p. 136. 
2. Ibid.' p. 136. 
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D. Basic Weakness of otto' s Method 
While it is felt that Otto makes a significant case for the auton ... 
omy of religion; his method suffers from one serious weakness. 
Having demonstrated that the numinous feeling, which is the 
basis of religion, is completely sui generis and thereby resists sub-
ordination to any of man's esthetic, rational or moral faculties, he 
fails to demonstrate its relation to these faculties,. indeed" to the 
whole man. Religion as it is described by him becomes one category 
alongside the other categories. This form.ulationr it is suggested, is 
inadequate, as it makes religion only a partner in man's spiritual 
activities. 
Davidson offers an alternate formulation of this central prob-
lem in Otto's method. He notes that otto utilizes the :insights of the 
Friesian philosophical system, with the highest form of insight ob-. 
tained by Ahndung~ However, because otto is contending for the 
autonomy of religion he radically separates religion from the esthetic 
category where Fries had placed it. He then fails to realize the seri,.. 
ous implications of such an effort. Where for Fries religion served 
as the bond:ing agent :in man's spiritual life, in addition to providing 
the bridge between the ideal and real world~ in Otto's system these 
factors are miss:ing. Nowhere, Davidson states~ does otto face 
directly the effects of his insistence upon a radical autonomy of 
1. . 1 re 1g10n. 
1. Davidson, pp. 156-157. 
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E. The Selfpreserying Power of the Holy 
Otto's characterization of the Holy suggests a vital force with ... 
in religion which prevents it from being incorporated in any of man's 
spiritual activities. He explicitly notes its resistance to domination 
by man' s. esthetic,_ moral1 and intellectual endeavors. To the question 
of "What is the source of this resistance?" the answer would seem to 
be,_ nThe nature of the Holy itself. 11 This quality might be termed the 
selfpreserving power of the Holy. 
In support of this characterization two additional authors are 
I 
cited. Reference to them is pertinent to the thought of otto because 
of their striking similarity to him in their emphasis. Both men share 
with Otto the insistence upon th~ autonomy of religion. In addition the 
characterization of the Holy which each offers demonstrates the power 
which the Holy possesses to resist reduetion. 
These authors and the works are Jaroslav Pelikan, Human 
Culture and the Holy1 and Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane. 
The former is a professor of history of religious theology, the latter 
a historian of religions. 
In Professor Pelikan's book, the Holy is contrasted with man's 
other spiritual faculties. He describes the character of the Holy as it 
was perceived by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky~ and Nietzsche. Each man 
was drawn to an equation for the Holy with human value. For Kierke-
gaard it was the 'l'rue. For Dostevskyt the Good. For Neitzsche, the 
Beautiful. Yet each man, he concludes> came to realize with existen-
tial dread that God cannot be domesticated in a value. But, on the 
other hand, the Holy is capable of possessing Truth_;. sheer Goodness, 
and Beauty. These intuitions,. it is suggested, were clearly seen by 
1. Jaroslav Pelikan, Human Culture and the Holy (London: SCM 
Press, Ltd., 1959.) 
•. 
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Paul, Luther and Bach, respectively. His descriptions of these 
dynamic tensions within the nature of the Holy make his work a .sig-
nificant .supplement to the insights of Otto. 
Mircea Eliade proposes to present the phenomena of the sa.-
cred in all its aspects. Otto's work serves as a point of departure 
for him in an attempt to des.cribe the radical dichotomy between the 
1 . 
realm of the sacred and the realm of the profane. How the sacred 
manifests itself in a stone, a tree or a man, etc. , the process called 
by him 11hierophany11, and how it transforms these objects into some-
thing "wholly other" is described. All his descriptions, however, are 
for the purpose of defining and exemplifying the sacred as the opposite 
2 
of the profane. 
Eliade1 s effort, with its phenomenological descriptions very 
similar to Otto's own attemP,tS, serves to confirm Rudolf Otto's 
insights. His work is offered as added data in support of the idea of 
the selfpreserving power of the Holy. 
1. He prefers the use of the English word "sacred" to "holy". 
2. Eliade~ p. 10. 
I 
~-
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CHAPTER IV 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION 
A. Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine Rudolf Otto 1 s 
phenomenological description of the 11moment 11 of religion. This as-
pect of religion is designated by the term "the non-rational. 111 
Because the non-rational factor, or numinous as he terms it, 
• 
is by definition incapable of precise conceptualization it can only be 
discussed symbolically. Symbols serve, for Otto, an evocative func-
tion. His specific designation of conceptual symbols as "ideograms" 
will "first be explored. Then the ideograms which he chooses to con-
vey the m,eaning of the experience of the holy will be examined. 
In addition to Otto's use of ideogram to suggest the nature of 
the numinous he utilizes a second method. By describing the mani-
festations of the numinous in religious literature; ritual, music¥ etc., 
he hopes to awaken a deep-felt awareness of it. This he calls the 
method of divination. 
Recognizing this emphasis in Otto, the second major section of 
this chapter will deal with the manifestations of the numinous. The 
examples cited will be Otto 1 s own. The justification for the citing of 
these apparently unrelated examples, is Otto's own contention that 
through such examples one gains an acquaintance with the numinous .. 
1. Cf .. Chapter III) 1., (b). 
• 
In fact, an acquaintance with the numinous is better facilitated by 
such examples, than by any ideogram which may be devised. 1 
1.- Otto, The Idea of the Holy_, p. 60. 
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B. Symbol 
1. Role in Otto 1 s Thought 
It must be made clear that Otto's phenomological description 
of religion deals primarily with the non-rational element. It has been 
shown that Otto's definition of non-rational is that element incapable 
of being contained in concept. The numinous is the positive content of 
a deeply felt experience. All descriptions of the experience must be 
held to be approximations. 
All modes of expressing the essential nature of the numinous 
are symbolic. The function of symbol is elaborated by Otto~ Initially 
he speaks of the numinous being transmitted from mind to mind. 
Then, however, he offers a corrective note. "There is,. of course, 
no 'transmission' of it in the proper sense of the word~ it cannot be 
1 taught' , it must be 1 awakened' from the spirit. 1 
The function of symbol, then, is evocative. The symbol is 
used to "awaken" within the hearer the feeling experienced by another~ 
Commenting upon the method of describing the affective states of the 
numinous 'Otto says~ "We must once again endeavor, by adducing ;feel-
ings akin to them for the purpose of analogy or contrast.. or by the 
use of metaphor and symbolic expressions, to make the states of mind 
we are investigating ring out, as it were o;f themselves. It 2 
An' additional word is offered in describing otto's method of 
communicating the meaning of the numinous. In what may be con-
sidered a classic statement of his entire approach to the numinous in 
The Idea of the Holy Otto asserts, 
1. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 60. 
2. Ibid., p. 12~ 
This mental state is perfectly sui generis 
and irreducible to any other, and therefore, like 
every absolutely primary and elementary datum, 
while it admits of being discussedj it cannot be 
strictly defined. There is only· one way to help 
another to an understanding of it. He must be 
guided and led on by consideration and discussion 
of the matter through the ways of his own mind, 
until he reaches the point at which ' the numinous 1 
in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life 
and into consciousness. We can co-operate in 
this process by bringing before his notice alllthat 
can be found in other regions of the mind, already 
known and familiar, to r~semble, or again to af-
ford some special contra$.t to~ the particular ex-
perience we wish to elucidate. Then we must add: 
' This X of ours is not precisely this experience, 
but akin to this one and the opposite of that other. 
Cannot you now realize for yourself what it is? n 
In other words our X cannot strictly speaking, be 
taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the 
mind, as everythinf that comes r of the spirit' 
must be awakened. 
1. Ibid, , p. 7. 
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2. Meaning of ttideogramtt 
a) Proper Use of qideogram" 
Otto designates the conceptual symbols used in describing the 
numinous as "ideograms 11 • He specifies that an ideogram is an ana-
logical notion taken from the natural sphere) illustrating but incapa ... 
ble of· exhaustively rendering, a particular aspect of the numinous. 1 
An ideogram is to be contrasted with a ,.concept proper11 in that it 
only proports to offer analogy to a numinous state. It does not claim 
to have d~scribed the state itself~ 2 
Otto cites Plato as one who recognized the need for ideogram 
in expressing the non-rational element of r.eligion. 
The most remarkable characteristic of Pla-
to's thought is just that he himself finds science and 
philosophy too narrow to comprise the whole of man's 
mental life. He has indeed properly no philosophy of 
religion; he grasps the object of religion by quite 
different means than those of conceptual thinking, 
viz., ·by the 1 ideograms' of myth, by 1 enthusiasm' 
or inspiration, 'eros' or love, 1 mania' or the div-
ine frenzy.. He abandons the attempt to bring the 
object of religion into one system of knowledge with 
the objects of 1 science'; i.e., reason,.. and it be-
comes something no less but greater thereby; while 
at the same time it is just this that allows the sheer 
non ... rational aspect of it to be· so vividly felt in Plato 
and indeed vividly expressed as well as felt. 3 
b) Abuse of Ideogram 
Otto cautions against the misuse of an ideogram. While the 
insights of ideograms may aid in an understanding of the numinous~ 
1. Ibid., p. 26. 
2. Ibid., p. 19. 
3 .. lbid.,. pp .. 94-95. 
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their use involves intrinsic dangers. 
Fichte and Schopenhauer are cited as examples of writers 
guilty of misuse of ideograms. Having included in their speculations 
on the nature of the Absolute such concepts as 11energyll and "will'1 
they have taken these ideograms as more than symbolic statements~ 
As a result they claim to suggest adequate concepts upon which a 
11scientific 11 structure of knowledge may be based where such an effort, 
according to otto,. is clearly impossible~ Their error stems from a 
failure to appreciate the non--rational aspect of religion. 1 
Misunderstanding of the nature of an ideogram can lead to the 
pseudo-science of theosophy. Concepts such as anthropomorphism 
are illustrations of such an abuse of ideograms. 
The characteristic mark of all theosophy is just this:. 
having confounded analogical and figurative ways of 
e.JqJressing feeling with rational concepts, it then 
systematizes them,. and out of them spins, like a 
monstrous web, a 1 science' of God, which is and 
remains something monstrous. 2 
L Ibid. , p. 24 .. 
2. Ibid. J pp. 107-108. 
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C .. Description of the Numinous by Ideogram 
Keeping in mind the limitations on the function of ideogram, 
which have just been noted, it is now proposed to examine the particu-
lar ideograms chosen by otto to describe the numinous. More than 
one ideogram is suggested by him. This serves to illustrate the vari-
ety of ways the numinous is encountered, or what Eliade calls the 
11modalities of religious experience. n 1 
otto's designation of the numinous is contained in the Latin 
phrase mysterium tremendum et fascinans. Each word in the phrase 
signifies one distinct aspect of the numinous and will be dealt with 
separately. Otto characterizes the entire Latin phrase in the follow-
ing quotation. 
The feeling of it m.ay at times come sweeping 
like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil 
mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a 
more set and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing 
as it were, thrillingly vibrant and resonant, until at 
last it dies away and the soul resumes its 1 profane', 
non-religious mood of everyday experience. It may 
burst in sudden eruptions up from the depths of the 
soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the 
strongest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy; to 
transport, and to ecstasy. It has its wild and demonic 
forms and can sink to an almost grisly horror and 
shuddering. It has its crude, barbaric antecedents 
and early manifestations and again it may be developed 
into something beautiful and pure and glorious. It 
may become hushed, trembling, and speechless 
humility of the creature in the presence of - whom or 
what? In the presence of that which is
2
a mystery 
inexpressible and above all creatures. 
1. Eliadet- p. 8~ Eliade is referring in this passage specifically to 
Otto's description of the numinous in The Idea of the Holy. 
2. otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 12-13. 
With this general characterization of the numinous our anal-
ysis focuses on each of its aspects as suggested by ideogram. 
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1. Analysis of Tremendum 
a) The Element of Awfulness 1 
( 1) Religious Dread 
The moment of numinous experience is characterized by an 
unnaturalness. The realization of this element produces an emotional 
response. The result is a feeling of fear, but not fear in the ordinary 
sense! This is fear with a spectral element, a religious dread. otto 
cites Old Testament passages where such an element is referred to. 
nr will send my fear before thee, n are the words of YHWH, 11and will 
destroy all the people to whom thou shalt co;me. 11 (Exodus 23:27.) Note 
also Job 9:34; 13:21. "Let not his fear terrify me1 11 "Let not thy 
dreaq make me afraid. 11 
The experience of this unnatural fear is often accompanie:d by 
shuddering, or "fear and trembling" as it is sometimes described. 
The creature before the numinous experiences terror. The experi ... 
ence appears uncanny, wierd, eerie, and is marked off as "Holyn. 
The concept of "Fear of God" must be seen as a developed idea of the 
11higher" religions, but basically stemming from this quality of the 
numinous. 
In its more primitive ma:rifestations the feeling may evoke 
the demonic and the divine alike. In this connection Otto states, 
All ostensible explanations of the origin of religion 
in terms of animism or magic, or folk-psychology 
are doomed from the outset to wander astray and 
miss the real goal of their inquiry, unless they 
recognize this. fact of our nature .. primary, 
1. The sense of the term "awful" here is: to be filled with awe in a 
profound sense. It is not to be confused with the colloquial usage 
of the same word. 
·e 
unique, underivable from anything else- to be the 
basic impulse underlying the entire process of re-
ligious evolution. 1 
Thus, for Otto, religious manifestations are only explained 
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in terms of our a priori disposition to the numinous. The primitive 
demonic 'expressions may give way to the more developed, more 
11rationalized11 ideas of deity but the intuitions behind both are of the 
numinous. The intuitions must be seen to stem from the unique valu-
ation placed upon the experience as our mental predispositions are 
awakened. The natural man, Luther had said, does not know how to 
fear God perfectly. The natural man, Otto adds, is quite unable to 
shudder or feel horror in the real sense of the word. 
The religions of primitive man, otto suggests, are to be dis-
tinguishable by their one-sided emphasis on the element of dread. as 
it appeared as "demonic dread. 11 But some of it remains with us to-
day. Recalling the· context of such statements as "my blood ran cold, 11 
or nmy flesh crept" suggests this element of the numinous has not 
completely disappeared today. 
Otto notes the development of the feeling of religious dread or 
awe by citing a hy.;mn of Tersteegen. 
Holy, holy, holy, 
God Himself is presentt 
Heart, be stilled before Him: 2 Prostrate inwardly adore Him. 
11The 1 shudder', 11 Otto .states, 11Has here lost its crazy and 
bewildering note, but not the ineffable something that holds the mind. 
It has become a mystical awe ... 113 
1. Ottot p. 15. 
2. Ibid~, p. 17. 
3. Ibid. 
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(2) The "Wrath" of God 
otto suggests that the tremendum contains another element. 
This insight is helpful in resolving a problem of Old Testament exe-
gesis. YHWH, is attributed with a "wrath, 11 that often seems irrecon-
silible with the God of modern times who is usually described in pre-
dominately ethical terms. Commenting upon this modern misunder-
standing of the entire basis for the 11wrath'L of YHWH otto asserts that 
this 11wrath11 has no concern whatsoever with moral qualities. 1 
Wrath of God is to be considered in the nature of a force, in-
calculable, arbitrary. Such may appear as mere caprice or wilful 
passion but such a view would have been emphatically rejected by the 
religious men of the Old Testament. 
2 . 
1 Wrath' here is an 1 ideogram' of a unique emo-
tional moment in religious experience, a moment 
whose singularly daunting and awe-inspiring 
character must be gravely disturbing to those 
persons who will recognize nothing in the divine 
nature but goodness, gentleness, love, and a sort 
of confidential intimacy, in a word, only those 3 
aspects of God which turn towards the world of men. 
The element of wrath remains an analogy. It is taken from 
the ordinary passional life of men. But in a disconcerting way it sug-
gests the tremendum as an aspect of the numinous. 
b) The Element of Majesty 
(1) "Overpoweringness 11 
One is asked to reflect upon the term majestic,. for, otto sug-
gests, some of the numinous still cling to it today. All its non-
L Ibid. I p. 18. 
.2. Ibid. 
3, Ibid, .. p. 19-
eq 
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rational character has not been lost by the constant process of ration-
alization which religion undergoes. The element of majesty on the 
objective side carries with it the sense of 11overpoweringness11 • On 
the subjective side the intuition of this power leads to self.-.depreciation 
1 by the creature. 
(2) ttcreature ... feelingn 
The element of majesty of the numinous contributes to the 
11creature-feelingn. This expression is chosen by otto as an alter-
native formulation to Schleiermacher1 s phrase '':the feeling of abso-
lute dependence." 
'In addition to the objections already cited concerning Schleier-
macher' s choice of terminology, otto attacks Schleiermacher1 s for-
mulation from a different aspect. The difference between the ttfeeling 
of absolute dependencen and the words of Abraham is the difference be-
tween the consciousness of createdness (Geschaffenheit) and the con-
sciousness of creaturehood (Geschopflichkeit). 2 
The latter intuition is not to imply a rational doctrine of cre-
ation as is sometimes interpreted. This 1 otto claims is implied only 
in the former term. 3 The ideogram of creaturehood or "creature-
feeling11 i;m.plies r'ather the sense of nothingness, powerlessness, an 
impotence of the creature. 
The appreciation of creaturehood leads to one of the commonest 
elements in mystical writings. Mysticism,. Otto notes~ is the over-
stressing of the non-rational in religion. Its utterances are only 
1. Recall the words of Abraham (Gen. 18:27), and Isaiah (Isa. 6:5), 
cited fn Chapter II! .. 
2. Ibid., -p.- 21. 
3. Ibid. 
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intelligible when taken in this light. 1 When this fact is coupled with 
the element of majesty as it overpowers himt- i;he ;mystic is driven to 
self-depreciation1 self-negation. He is led,. as was Isaiah in the 
example cited, to the depreciation of himself and his tribe around 
him. The sense of overpoweringn~ss must be recognized as a sig-
nificant factor in the tendency of the mystic to Identification. This 
identification occurs as his own significance pales 1 as his will, his 
. 2 
power_, disappear before the Allpowerful One. 
c) The Element of " Energyll or Urgency 
This aspect of the numinous was hinted at in the discussion of 
the "wrath" of YHWH. It frequently manifests itself in symbolic ex-
pressions such as vitality_, passion, emotional temper, will, force, 
movement, excitement, activity, impetus. 3 Its appreciation leads to 
concepts of the nLiving God. n 
otto suggests that at this point the struggle between the rtphil-
osopher' s 11 God and the "mystic's" God is keenestw If the mystic fails 
to recognize these terms as mere analogies~ taken from man's cona ... 
tive and affective life, then the criticism by the philosophers is valid. 
On the other hand, the philosopher' s failure to 11understandn the non-
rational has led to one-sided theories about God. 
This cleavage is forcefully presented in Luther's controver-
sies with Erasmus~ 11Luther1 s omnipotentia Dei in his De Servo · 
Arbitrio is nothing, n otto claims1 "but the union of 1 majesty' - in 
the sense of absolute supremacy - with the sense of force that knows 
not stint nor stay, which is urgent, compelling, and alive. n 4 
L Ibid.' p. 22 .. 
2. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
3w Ibid.' p. 23. 
4. Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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Again otto refers to an aspect of mysticism. In "voluntaristic" 
mysticism especially, he notes the pleas of the mystic who feels the 
consuming fire of love and must beg for mitigation lest he be consumed. 
Such a petition illustrates the energy of the numinous as did the ele-
ment of wrath. "Love, '1 in fact, 1 says one of the mystics 1 nrs nothing 
1 
else than quenched wrath. 11 
L Ibid. , p. 24. 
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2. Analysis of Mysterium 
a) Relation to 11Tremendum 11 
It is now proposed to examine an additional aspect of the "mo-
ment" of religious experience. On this element otto places great 
importance. From the intuitions suggested by the ideogram mysteri-
um he hopes to trace significant theological doctrines. In addition1 he 
hopes to continue his examinations_ of mysticism~< with his persistent 
ai;m to demonstrate the meaningful insights implied but usually only 
paradoxically stated therein. 
While mysterium is the substantive to which the adjective 
tre;mendum is related, the adjective does not in this case merely ex-
plain the substantive. ldeas contained in the former are distinct and 
separable from those of the latter and vice versa. Within any particu ... 
lar numinous experience either the elements implied in mysterium or 
those of tremendum ;may predominate. In some cases it is possible 
that one element or the other may hardly be present at all. 
b) Unresolvable Nature of HMystedum" 
As in the case of the other.ideograms suggested by otto, mys-
terium borrows from the idea of mystery as it is commonly under-
stood. In this sense one obtains the ideas of something secret, alien, 
unco;mprehended or unexplained. In addition, it could be contended 
that this mystery is utterly incapable of comprehension or explana ... 
tion. These ideas~ Otto believes; approximate the idea of mysterium. 1 
But, it must be remembered, they are only analogies. Otto is driving 
toward a still deeper meaning of mysterium. This element, is of all 
1~ Ibid. ' p. 26. 
0 
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the aspec~s of the nun;linous the most difficult to elucidate. 1 Otto 
suggests that it be characterized by the term ''the wholly other. 11 
c) The hWholly Other" 
(1) Its :positive Content 
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,.To give it perhaps the most striking expression, " Otto stat~s, 
nThat which is mysterious is the 1 wholly other' , that which is quite 
beyond the sphere of the u~ual, the intelligible, and the familiar, 
which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the 1 canny' , and is 
contrasted with it, filling the mind with bl~nk wonder and astonish-
2 
ment. 11 
The feeling of the itwholly othern stems from the intuition of 
something which has no place in our scheme of reality. In this 11mo-
ment11 the numinous is regarded as beyond our natural apprehension 
and comprehension. This is not the case simply because of the limits 
of our knowledge. The sense of disparity is heightened by the feeling 
that the numinous is of a character incommensurable with our own~ 
Reaction~ on the part of the creature, comes in the form of 
11wonder that strikes us chill and numb. 113 Otto differentiates this 
feeling from the trep:tor implied in tremendum. This mental reaction 
is rather one of stupor which includes ideas of blank wonder, amaze-
4 
ment absolute. 
1. otto, Religious Essays, p. 78. 
2. otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 26. 
3.. Ibid. , p .. 28. 
4.. As an example of the differentiation between the feelings of 
11tremor11 and nstupor11 Otto cite.s Mark 10~32. "And they were 
on the road, going up to Jerusalem and .Jesus was walking ahead 
of them; and they were amazed, and those who followed were 
afraid .. '1 (RSV) 
(2) Its 1.mplications 
1n attempting to e:Kplain in greater detail the meaning of the 
"wholly .other" otto attacks several theories of religion. A proper 
understanding of the meaning of the "wholly other'\ he feels, will 
expose these theories as inadequate. 
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(a) The Theory of Animism. - The beginnings of religion are not to 
be explained by a theory of Animism.. Religion does not stem from 
men's curious concern for entities called 11soulsn or 11spirits 11 , which 
may happen to be invisible. Such representations, otto contends,. are 
already the early stages of "rationalization 11 as men attempt to explain 
the fact of religion, These primitive theories may lead to the con-
struction of elaborate myths. But the myths,. in the same way as later 
rational theologies may serve only to destroy that which they intended 
originally to express, viz., the mysterious moment "wholly othern in 
character. 
Both imaginative 1 myth' i when developed into a sys-
tem, and intellectualistic Scholasticismi when worked 
out to its completion, are methods by which the funda-
mental fact of religious experience is~ as it were, 
simply rolled so thin and flat as to be finally elimi-
nated altogether.l 
The lowest level of religious development is thus only by mis-
understanding characterized by animistic theories. The beginnings of 
religion must in all cases be traced to something else, viz., " ..• a 
peculiar 1 moment' of consciousness, to wit, the .stupor before some-
thing 1 wholly other' f whether such an other be named 1 spirit' or 
1 daemon' or 1 deva1 ~ or be left without any name. " 2 
(b) The Theory of Anthropomorphism. - Naturalistic exponents of 
1. otto~ The Idea of the Holy, p. 27. 
2. Ibid. 
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religion_, Otto notes.t are disposed to quoting the statement of 
Xenophanes: nif oxen could paint, they would depict the gods as oxen. 111 
But just as the theory of animism fails to probe deeply enought into 
the nature of the nwholly Qther11 so too the theory of anthropomorphism 
does not succeed in getting at the root of religion. The anthropomor-
phic element is an accretion_, not a primary element. 
The true Pallas Athene is not the humanized Atheni-
an noblewoman portrayed by Phidias, nor the charm-
ing girl of Myro, but rather that uncanny,. owlish 
being which haunted the ancient Attic rampart, and 
to which Homer bears reluctant testimony when he 
speaks of his 1 glaukopian' goddess_, the 'owl-faced' 
Athene. An awful majesty is the attribute of the 
ancient ~ow 't\" ;_ ~ ,. the cow-headed Hera, rather 
than of the matronly spouse of Zeus. When the god-
desses and gods became elegant,. charming, and 
human~ belief in them was not at its prime~ as 
would be the case if the anthropomorphic view were 
correct, but was already in its decline_,. and they 
were being superseded by the foreign gods from 
Egypt and the Far East for the very reason that 2 these gods again were strange and 1 wholly other' . 
Otto suggests that the statement by Heraclitus, - "Homer should 
be banned from the public festivals 11 - was his recognition that Homer 
had turned myth to>poetry and epic, and was incorporating the gods 
with humanity while destroying the divine elements. 
The God which is portrayed by Plato, Empedocles, even Xen-
ophanes is characterized not by his si;rnilarity to men but by his dis-
parity. 3 A study of the various sy.mbols for deity impresses one not 
1. Otto, Religious Essays, p. 78. 
2. Ibid. , p.- 79~ 
3. otto cites quotations by these men) eg. , Plator "The One.1' who 
alone is wise,. does not wish and yet wishes to be called by the 
name of Zeus11 or nit is in relation to the king of all and on his 
account that everything exists. In regard to the king and the 
0 
0 
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with their similarity to men~ as anthropomorphism contends. It 
illustrates instead,_ Otto asserts 1 quite the opposite. Men~ he notes~ 
11 
.... have the strange predilection to see their gods as half or as 
whole cattle, as calvesj- horses, crocodiles, elephants, birds, fish-
es, as hybrid monstrosities" and who knows what besides. 111 
This fact must be viewed as an expression of the 11wholly 
other11 as it is applied to the religious moment. It is an awareness of 
the 'Lwholly other11 which explains the reluctance on the part of some 
religions, even primitive onesi to symbolize God at all. In this case 
images or words are forbidden from being used with regard to the 
nWholly Other. 11 Here the disparity between the wor:ld of human ex-
perience and the sphere of the God is felt to be absolute. 
(c) The Theory of Negative Theology. - Since.J- as has already been 
mentioned1 Otto asserts the numinous experience to be a feeling of 
positive valuation~ any strictly negative theology is unacceptable. 
However, Otto considers such negative theologies highly signifi-cant 
because they illustrate the intuition of the 11wholly other11 • 
Pit is not thus~ not thus, n Otto quotes an old Upanishad as 
2 
saying. Or again 
Anyad eva tad viditatt 
Atho aviditad adhi. 
It is other than (all) that is knowable 
things I mentioned there is nothing like this. 11 Empedocles~ "We 
cannot bring the godhead near,_ so as to be attainable to our vision 
.• , neither is it endued with a human head . • • there is only a 
spirit, holy and inexpressible 1 that stirs there. n Xenophanes: 
110ne single god1 the greatest amongst gods and men; like unto 
mortals neither in his form nor his thoughts. 11 otto, Religious 
Essays~ pp. 79·-80"' 
1.. Ibid. ' p. 80. 
2. Ibid. ' p. 82. 
.e 
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And also beyond (all} that is not knowable. 1 
ln both quotations emphatic negations are to be observed. The second 
is. stronger than the first for it negates not only. what is capable of be-
ing known but also that which is incapable of being known~ In this 
characterization the "wholly other11 (Anyad eva) is suggested. 
otto cites two Christian doctrines which must be regarded as 
negative theology. While they are conceptualizations they point to the 
non-conceptual nature of the numinous, the "wholly other. 11 
First, the doctrine of si;mplicitas Dei is noted.. While not 
arising e~clusively from t~e "wholly othern otto contends it is influ-
enced thereby. This doctrine is summarized by otto in three steps. 
(1) God cannot be brought within the framework of conceptions or 
qualifications which are abstracted from any other source than Him ... 
self. (2) Therefore God is not amenable to conceptions or qualifica-
tions. which can be stated at all. ( 3} Finally such a characterization 
would imply God is not amenable to any conception or qualification. 2 
The being of God is therefore held to be "insusceptible to any ab-
straction or conceptual diremption,_ and inde~d opposed thereto. 113 
This negative theology may be positive characterized by the 
following expression·. 11God is just 1 simple' because he is just 
1 wholly other'. 4 
The second doct.rine to be noted is that which claims God ;I.s the 
esse of things. This doctrine1 Otto feels, is the attempt to transcend 
the negations of the "wholly other" which have been noted up to this 
point. God is not related to the world or to Himself through the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p .. .84. 
3. Ibid . 
4. lbid.-
0 
0 
categories.. He is "wholly other" than them. 
Now the doctrine of God as the esse of all things 
, make$ the attempt, an impossible one, to transcend 
our categories positively, i.e., to give a positive 
fulfillment to what is merely negative formula of 
the transcendent fundamental relationship, and in 
that respect to withdraw the Anyad eva fro;rn. the 
impenetrable darkness of religious feeling and to 
resolve it for the intellect. This is an error, but a 
most significant error. 1 
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The error which otto is refe.rring to is this. Mter discarding 
all other categories~ this theory adopts the category of substance. 
Spinoza, he says1- was: guilty of this errorw· A proper understanding 
of the "wholly other11 leads to a discarding not only of time,.. place~ 
nu;rn.bert measures but also all conceptual determination, therefo;t'e 
the category of substance-accident. 2 
(3) Its eontribution to Mysticism 
ln attempting to convey the meaning of the 11wholly other" it 
will be noted that our method itself has had to depend heavily on the 
procedure of negations. The nwholly other11 has peen characterized 
by what it was not but its positive content has remained a feeling or 
conviction and an element impossible to adequately express. 
Appreciation of this fact~ otto again claims~ is best exem-
plified by the mysticw 
·Mysticism continues to its extreme point this con-
trasting of the numinous object (the numen)t as the 
1 wholly other' ~ with ordinary experience. Not con ... 
tent with contrasting it with all that is of nature or 
this world, mysticism concludes by contrasting it 
with Being it5:elf and all that 1 is 1 ,. and finally 
L Ibid .. ~ p .. 85. 
2.- Ibid. ' p. 88 .. 
0 
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actually calls it 1 that which is nothing' . By this 
1 nothing 1 is meant not only that of which nothing 
can be predicted, but that which is absolutely and 
intrinsically other than and opposite of everything 
that is and can be thought. But while exaggerated 
to the point of paradox this negation and contrast -
the only means open to conceptual thought to appre-
hend the mysterium - mysticism at the same time 
retains the positive quality of the ' wholly other' as 
a very living factor in its over-brimming religious 
emotion. 1 
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Not only_,. Otto notes; does the "nothingness 11 of Christian 
mystics or "void11 and Hemptiness11 of Buddhist mystics suggest, by 
negation;_ the meaning of the rtwholly other. 11 SUch apparently posi-
tive terms as "supe~natural't and 'Ltranscendent" must be viewed as 
equally negative concepts. They are actually negations with refer-
ence to rtnature 11 and the 11cosmos 11• 
But once again Otto leaves little room for misunderstanding 
with regard to the positive element of the numinous. "tt is th;r-ough 
this positive feeling-content, " he states, HThat the concepts of the 
1 transcendent' and' supernatural' become forthwith designations for 
a unique 1 wholly other' reality and quality, something of whose 
special character we can feel, without being able to give it clear con-
ceptual expression. rt 2 --
d). The Element of Fascination 
(1) Polarities within the Numinous 
The phrase myste;r'ium tremendum et fascinans. suggests the 
dual character of the numinous consciousness. The element of daunt-
ing 11awfulness 11 and 11majesty" has been shown as an expression of the 
tremendum. The nature of the tremendum. was further characterized 
l~ Otto; The Idea of the Holy, p. 29.-
2. !bid. ' p. 30. 
0 
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by the experienc~ of the "wrath It of God, 
While the numinous object may appear to the mind as a s.ource 
of horror or dread, it must also be observed to produce an opposite 
effect. The 11daemonico..divine object'• 1 is felt as something which 
allures. with a potent charm. "The creature~ who trembles. before it, 
utterly cowed and cast downs- has. always at the same time the impulse 
to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own., u 2 This aspect of 
the numinous bewilders and confounds. It is. capable of captivating 
and transporting the creature .. It may even rise to a state of frenzy 
and intoxication. It is, OI;to states, the Dionysiac element of the 
np.men. 
While .such Jtschematan as wrath, the gruesome,_ the monstrous 
are suggested in attempting to convey the tremendumt- the fascinans is 
s.chematized by terms such a.s 1oveJ mercy, pity,_ comfort. otto 
suggests these terms. with the following qualification .. 
But important as these are for the experience bliss 
or felicity,_ they do not by any means exhaust it. It 
is just the same as with the opposite expedence of 
religious infelicity - the exper~ence of the 1 wrath 1 
of God- both alike contain fundamentally non-rational 
elements. Bliss or beatitude is more, far more, 
than the mere natural feeling of being _comforted, of 
reliance, of the joy of love, however theS-e may be 
heightened and enhanced. Just as 'wrath', taken 
in a purely ral:ion~l or a purely ethical sense, does 
not exhaust the profound element of awefulness 
which is locked in the mystery of deityt so neither 
does. 1 graciousness 1 exhaust the profound element 
of wonderfulness. and rapture which lies in the 
mysterious beatific experience of deity. 3 
L otto's expres.sion1 Ibid., p. 31. 
2. "Ibid. 
3.. Ibid. ' pp. 32-33. 
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(2) The· Feeling of l.onging 
Further characterization of the fas cinans of the numinous is 
.suggested in the religious feeling of longing. otto believes this factor 
is vividly exemplified by those rites which aim at achieving identifi-
cation with the numen itself. While he admits the starting point for 
;many of these exercises may be magic, 1 possession by the numen 
may become an end in itself. When the latter becomes the case 11 • ~ ., 
the vita religiosa beg;i.ns; and to remain in these strange and bizarre 
states of numinous possession becomes a good in it~elf, even a way 
of salv~tiont wholly dif:terent from the profane goods pursued by 
2 
means of magic"' H 
The feeling of longing gives rise to various for,ms which claim 
to be the frilfill;ment of the feeling. Such ideas as eschatological 
promises of the coming kingdo;m o;f God; the bliss of Paradiset or a 
present or future entry into a beatific reality '~above the worldn are 
to be viewed in this way .. 3 
An example of the longing produced by the numinous experience 
is cited by otto. It is,. as he terms it, art eschatological hymn of 
longing by St. Bernard. · 
1 0 Sion,. thou city sole and single.r mystic mansion 
hidden away in the heavens~ now I rejoice in thee, 
now I moan for thee and mourn and yearn for thee~ 
thee often I pass through in the heartt as I cannot 
in the body., but being but earthly fl~sh and fleshly 
earth soon I fall back. None can disclose or utter 
in speech what plenary radiance fills thy,; walls and 
thy citadels. I can as little tell of it as t can touch 
the skies with my finder,: or run upon the sea Dr 
1. He defines magic as simply to appropriate the prodigious force 
of the numen for the natural ends of man"' Ibid., .P· 33. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. , p. 36. 
0 
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make a dart ~tand .still in the air.. This thy splen-
dour overwhelms every heart, 0 Sion~ 0 Peace! 0 
timeless City, no praise can belie thee. 0 new 
dwelling ... place, thee the concourse and people of the 
faithful erects and exalts, inspires and increafes, 
joins to itself, and makes complete and one'. 
(3) The Feeling of Positive Content 
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In addition to exemplifying the feellng of longing, the preceding 
hymn ia noteworthy in its use of the method of negation. A close 
examination of it finda it to be one negation compounded upon another. 
Yet the ,effect of reading or reciting it tends to obscure this fact .. 
Before offering Otto' s explanation of this fact a Biblical passage 
is noted. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered 
into the heart of man1" things which God hath prepared for them that 
love himw n [ISA. 64;4; I COR. 2t9] 
Both quotations contain the feeling of transport. Both resort 
to· whole chains of negationr Yet, as otto notes, in reading and hear ... 
ing them their merely negative character simply is not noticed., "All 
this teaches us," he asserts; nthe independence of the positive content 
of this experience from the implications of its overt conceptual ex-
press-ion,. and how it can be firmly grasped, thoroughly understood,. 
and profoundly appreciated~ purely in~ with;. and from the feeling 
2 it~elf. n 
( 4) The Feeling of the nGver-abounding11 
As otto has done on numerous other occasions, he demon-
strates how :the particular aspect of the numinous being considered 
lends intelligibility to mystical statements. An intense intuition of 
the fascinating character of the numinous by the mystic leads him to 
1. Ibid. , p. 35 .. 
2. Ibid .. ' p. 34. 
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a state of blissful excitement, rapture, and exaltation verging on the 
:bizarre and abnormal.. It is little wonder- that the mystical utter-
ance~ stemming from this state lack consistency. 
With the mystics the experiences pass over into the 11over-
aboundingn and the non-rational element in the beatific experience be-
comes immediately noticeable. 1n this context the following quota-
tions are instructive. 
Otto chooses the following examples from James' Var;ieties 
of Religious Experience. 
One individuaJ. writes t 
.. • • For the moment nothing but a;n ineffable joy and 
exaltation remained. It is imposs;ible fully to de-
scribe the experience .. It was like the effect of some 
great orchestra; when aU the separate notes have 
melted into one swelling harmony, that leaves the 
listener conscious of nothing save that his soul is 
being wafted upwards and almost bursting with its 
own emotion.l 
otto selects in addition the following statement by Jonathan Edwards. 
The conceptions which the saints have of the lovli-
ness of God and that kind of delight which they 
experience in it are quite peculiar and entirely 
different from anything which a natural man can 2 possess or of which he can form any proper notion. 
The 11over-aboundingn is further exemplified by this quotation 
of Jacob Boehme. 
But I can neither write nor tell of what sort of 
Exhaltatio;n the triumphing in the Spirit is. It 
'can be compared with nought, but that when in 
the midst of death life is born,. and it is. like the 
1., James.t p. 66., 
2., Ibid. ' p. 229~ 
c 1 
resurrection of the dead. 
The fascinans is characterized by one additional quotation. 
1 0 'that I could tell you what the heart feels, how 
it. burns and is consumed inwardly!. Only.t I find 
no words to express it. I can but sayr Might but· 
one little drop of what I feel fall into Hell1 Hell 
would be transformed into a Paradise. 1 So says 
St. Catherine of Genoa;- and all the multitude of her 
spiritual kindred testify to the same effect. 2 
e) Tensions within the Numinous 
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The numinous expe.riencet like Fries' :eeeling .of Ahndung is 
characterized by its positive content. Th~ unique value placed upon 
i:he numen stems from its mysterious character, "wholly othe;r.rt jn 
nature. The tensions within the numinous are caused by its dual 
nature. On the one hand the creature reacts with fear and trembling 
as the awful aspect of the numinous is felt. On the other hand,_ the 
creature is drawn nearer by a fascination caused by ·i:he unique datum 
presented to him. It is contended that otto has successfully incor-
porated in the ideogram mysterium tremendum et fas cinans a char-
acterization of the non--;rational in religion.. In addition he has suc-
ceeded in making one aware of the shortcomings of such an effort. 
1, Ibid. ' p. 417. 
2. otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 38. 
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D. Manifestations of the Numinous 
1.. Introduction 
The method of ideogram was shown to be utilized by otto to 
convey the variety of modes of numinous exper.iencer The terrible, 
the sublime~ the overpowering, or the astounding· .w;ere some of its 
characterizations.. The sense of uncomprehended mystery was strong-
ly emphasized. Keeping in mind the limitations which Otto places 
upon the method of ideogram these symbolizations of the numinous 
were utilized because of their analogous nature to the numinous. They · 
were; however, only opportunitiesjc circumstances~ prompting there-
ligious feeling to awake of itself. The method of ideogram remained 
an indirect rout~ to numinous encounter. 
Otto does not leave the matt~r in this state. He suggests that 
since the numinous is an operative reality in the· world one may .be-
come consciously aware of it. "It may be directly encountered~ n 
otto asserts with reference to the numinous,. 11in particular occur-
rences and events,_ self-revealed in persons and displayed in actions .. ,tl 
This approach to the numinous is superior to the indirect 
method of ~deogram. It does not depend on the tranS1!liSs~on of words 
or concepts and therefore does not .suffer from ihe intrinsic limita-
tions of the method of ideogram.. "More of the experience~ '1 Otto 
notes, nlives in reverent attitude and gesture, in tone and voice and 
demeanol', expressing its momentousnesst and in the solemn devo-
tional assembly of a congregation at prayer, than in all the phrases 
and negative nomenclature which we have found to designate it. 11 2 
By what he describes as the method of divination Otto hopes to 
1.. Ibid. , p. 143, 
2.. Ibidr, P• 60. 
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suggest actual appearances of the holy. "Genuine divination_, 11 he 
states, ·'•is not concerned at all with the way in which a phenomenon 
- be it event, person, or thing - came into existence~ but with what it 
.means~ that iSt with its significance as a 1 sign' of the holy. n. 1 
Jt becomes clear in .s.tudying ottot .s discussion of the method of 
divination that he is referring to basically the same concept as 
Schleiermacher' s "contemplation" or Fries' nAhndung. 11 It can }Je 
characteri~ed as an intuitive awareness of the Holy within the cosmic 
system., otto' s formulat;[on of this idea must be understood as com-
pletely dependent upon the presuppositions of his theory of the religious 
a priori discussed in Chapter m~ 
Our discussion proposes to examineJo at this timer the mani,_ 
festations of the numinous in painting and sculpture4 architecture,_ 
liturgy'" music and literature. It will conclude with a discussion of 
its appearances in persons. 
1.. Ibid~~ p. 145~ 
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2 .. Painting and Sculpture 
One may recall having been exposed to the paintings or draw-
ings of primitive cultures and having been repulsed by their hideous-
ness.- Various images may have been portrayed which present day 
standards would label as. grotesque and worthless except for being a 
link with antiquity. Yet, otto notes,_ ·one finds in these creations 
first attempts at expressing the tremendum of the numinous. The 
horror or fearfulness. such images portray reveal the awfulness of 
the experience,. "wholly other" than experiences of normal profane 
existencer 
There· exist even to the present certain exceptional paintings 
in which the quality of the tremendum is unmistakably obvious and 
effectual... otto cites the hard, stern, and somewhat grim pictures of 
the Madonna in ancient Byzantine art. The paintings attract the wor-
ship of many Catholics more than do Raphael's Madonnas. with their 
tender charm. 
notes, 
Continuing his discussion of the tre;mendum in painting Otto 
This trait is most signally evident in the case 
of certain figures o;t' gods in the Indian pantheon .. 
Durga ... the 1 great Mother' of Bengal" whose worship 
can appear steeped in an atmosphere of profound 
,devotional awe, is represented in the orthodox 
tradition with the visage .of a fiend.1 
In painting and sculpture., and~ as will be shown, to a significant 
degree in architecture,. the method of negation becomes a positive tool 
in expressing the mysterium of the numinous. This occurs by means 
of darkness. In darkness the tendency to negation is given visual form. 
l. ~-~ p .. 62 •. 
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While, otto notes, Western art makes frequent use of darkness 
in religious paintings and images, Oriental art knows yet another way 
of expressing the m;r.minous. This is through the portrayal of empti-
ness. He writes 
in Chinese painting .... there has almost 
become a special art to paint empty space, to make 
it palpable, and to develop variations upon this singu-
lar theme. Not only are there pictu-res upon which 
1 almost nothing' is painted, not only is it an essential 
feature of their style to make the strongest impressions 
with the fewest number of strokes and the scantiest 
means, but there are very many pictures ... especially 
such as are connected with contemplation - which im-
press the observer with the feeling that the void itself 
~s depicted as a subject, is indeed the main subject of 
the picture. 1 
The genius of oriental artists at conveying the overpowering 
feeling of the mysterious is further noted by otto Fischer. Speaking 
of the great landsqape and religious paintings of the T' ang and Sung 
dynasties he says: 
These works are to be classed with the pro-
foundest and sublimest of the creations of human art. 
The spectator who, as it were, immerses himself in 
them feels behind these waters and clouds and moun-. 
tains the mysterious breath of the primeval Tao, the 
pulse of the innermost being. Many a mystery lies 
half-concealed and half-revealed in these pictures. 
They contain the knowledge of the ' nothingness 1 and 
the 1 void', of the 1 Tao' of heaven and earth1 which 
is also the Tao of the human heart. And so despite 
their perpetual agitation, they seem as remotely 
distant and as profoundly· calm as tho!fgh they drew 
secret breath at the bottom of a sea. 
1. Ibid., p. 69. 
2. otto Fischer, nChinese Landscape Painting," Das Kunstblatt, 
Jan., 1920. Cited by otto, The Idea of the Holy~ p. 67. 
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3. Architecture 
In the West the Gothic appears as the most numinous of the 
types of architecture. !nitial encounter of a great Gothic cathedral 
presents one with something absolutely overpowering in character. 
The sense of longing~ the element of fascinanst seems to be articula-
ted in stone as the thin towers rise higher and higher like arms 
straining upward to grasp heaven itself. This effect is increased by 
the buttresses which seem to return one's gaze to the center and up-
ward at the first sign of distraction. 
lnside the effect of the numinous is heightened. All lines are 
vertical or inclined upward. The columns are ~lender and restless~ 
As they ascend higher they grow thinner and more delicate appearing, 
as it were, incapable of supporting the ediface. The highest portions 
seem to show the stone melting away as the light streams in. 
The dynamic energy of the numinous is heightened in the 
Gothic by the rise of darkness. The vaults and recesses are in ten-
sion with the columns and sunlit walls. Light and darkness appear in 
dramatic conflict as stone thrusts outward then draws back again in an 
uneasy manner. The cathedral has become numinous; it stands in its 
part of the city as an interruption of the Holy into the world of the 
1 profane. 
Otto again makes reference to the Oriental use of emptiness. 
He notes its effective utilization in Chinese architecture~ 
Chinese architecture, which is essentially ani art in 
the laying out and grouping of buildings, makes a 
wise and very striking use of this fact [the fact of 
emptiness]. It does not achieve the impression of 
1. This theme is suggested and developed in Eliade~ The Sacred and 
the Profane. 
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solemnity by lofty vaulted halls or imposing alti-
tudes, but nothing could well be more solemn than the 
silent amplitude of the enclosed spaces, courtyards, 
. and vestibules which it employs. The imperial tombs 
of the Ming emperors at Nanking and Peking are, per-
haps, the strongest example of this, including, as 
they do, in their plan the empty distances of an en-
tire landscape. 1 
1. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 69. 
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4. Liturgy 
Liturgy and music may be observed to convey the mysterium 
of the numinous in a singularly powerful manner. One notes, for 
example the use of ancient expressions1 some of which convey little if 
any conceptual significance. otto cites the expressions "Hallelujah", 
uKyrie eleison", 11Selah11 which are 11wholly othern just because they 
convey no clear meaning. They are retained as the language of devo ... 
tion because of the "spel111 1 they exercise on the worshipper. 
In similar fashion the Latin in the Mass is considered by the 
Catholic not a necessary evil, but, on the other hand,. something holy. 
otto notes the same regard for the Holy in the use of Sanskrit in the 
Buddhist Mass of China and Japan. The nlanguage of the godsll in the 
ritual of sacrifice of Homer provides yet another example of the use of 
the "language of devotion't in expressing the numinous:. 
Continuing, otto notes 
Especially noticeable in this connexion are the 
half-revealed; half-concealed elements in the ·source of 
the Mass, in the Greek Church liturgy, and so many 
others; we can see here one factor that justifies and 
warrants them.. And the same is true of the remaining 
portions of the old Mass which recur in the Lutheran 
ritual. Just because their design shows but little of 
regularity or conceptual arrangement, they preserve 
in themselves far more of the spirit of worship than 
the proposed recastings of the service put forward by 
the most recent practical reformers. In these we find 
carefully arranged schemes worked out with the balance 
and coherence of an essay,. but nothing unaccountable, 
and for that very reason suggestive, nothing accidental, 
and for that very reason pregnant in meaning; nothing 
that rises from the deeps below consciousness to break 
the rounded unity of the wonted disposition, and thereby 
point to a unity of a higher order - in a word, little that 
1~ Ibid. , p. 64 .. 
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is really spiritual. 1 
The preceding quotation is noteworthy in two respects. First 
it further elucidates the importance of liturgy, as Otto sees it, in 
expressing the numinous. Secondly; it serves to re-emphasize the 
central theory of religion of Otto. The emphasis heret as in so many 
of Otto's quotations1 is upon the non-rati-onal in religion. The fact that 
an element of religion is. not conceptualized does not, according to 
otto's viewpoint, ;make it inferior. This same emphasis has been 
noted in other writers. than Otto but it is by no means in the main-
stream of Western thought. For this reason, and at the risk of ex-
cessive ,repetition this important concept of Otto's philosophy. of re-
ligion is. again e;mphasized. 
1. Ibid., p. 65. 
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5. Music 
Esthetic appreciation is in Otto's theory of consciousness 
closely akin to the religion appreciation of the numinous~ while remain-
ing distinct from it. Because of this proximity musical creativity be-
comes a most effective means of evoking the numinous feeling. 
The power of music to express profound religious ideas is 
exemplified to an unusual degree in Bach's B ... Minor Mass. Special 
emphasis is placed upon the most mystical portio~, the uincarnatus .. '~ 
Confronted with the awesome task of portraying in some manner or 
another the ;incomprehensible mystery of the Incarnation Bach demon-
1 
strates great understanding of the doctrine. 
Bach suggests the element of mystery in a faint, whispedng, 
lingering sequence in the fugue structure, dying away pianissimo. 
rtThe held breath and hushed sound of the passage, its weird cadencesf 
sinking away in lessened thirds~ its pauses and syncopations, and its 
rise and fall in astonishing semi-tones, which render so well the sense 
of awe-struck wonder" serve to express the mysterium. 2 
Yet during the most mystical of all moments, when word be-
comes flesh, the music is powerless to express the fact positively. 
The import is conveyed again by the method of negation. Silence is 
felt for a significant duration. 
Oib elaborates on this utilization of silence. Recalling the use 
of empty space and darkness in architecture and painting Otto then adds 
Silence is what corresponds to this in the language of 
musical sounds., 'Yahweh is in his holy temple .. let all 
the earth keep silence before him. ' {Hab. ii. 20. ) .•. 
1. For a helpful discussion of Bach and the Holy see Pelikan1 Human 
Culture and the Holy, Chapter VI. 
2. Ibid ... p. 70~ 
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It is the same with Tersteegen in his 1 God is present, 
let all in us be silent' . With prophet and psalmist 
and poet we feel the necessity of silence from another 
and quite independent motive. It is a spontaneous re-
action to the feeling of the actual numen praesens.1 
1. Ibid.' pp. 68-69. 
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6. Literature 
A large portion of otto's investigations, especially his later 
e;fforts, was devoted to isolating the numinous in religious writings. 
Results of these studies ma).{e up the bulk of his Mysticism East and 
West and India's Religion of Grace. The appendices to The Idea of 
the Holy as well as Section II of Religious Essays offer additional re,... 
sults of his probing of this theme. 
At one point in referring to the numinous in the Old Testam·ent 
otto notes that isolation of its non-rational portions has been admi-
rably done by Chrysostom. Appendix I of The Idea of the Holy is Otto's 
review of this effort.. Otto cites examples of the numinous in the 
Bhagavad-Gita in Appendix II. In both his chapter on Luther and in 
Appendix VI in The Idea of the Holy~ Otto isolates something of the 
strong non-rational strain in the "Great Reformer'~. 1 
While otto's explorations of the numinous manifestations. take 
him from Abraham of ancient times to John Ruskin~ 2 he considers one 
example of the numinous. in literature an especially good one. Refer-
ences to it appear ;r-epeatedly in The Idea of the Holy. 3 One is referred 
to the non-rational element in the Old Testament book of Job. Special 
reference is made to the 38th chapter and following. Because of otto' s 
emphasis upon this. passage, and because it, like Bach's B-minor 
Mass, is an outstanding manifestation of the numinous; an exploration 
of this passage will now be offered. 
nin the 38th chapter of Job, 11 otto .States,. "We have the element 
of the mysterious displayed in rare purity and completeness, and this 
L See Chapter II discussion of Luther's influence on Otto. 
2. Cf.. The Idea of the Holy, pp. 9, 215. 
3. Cf. pp. 77-80, 100, 151, 153~ 200. 
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chapter may well rank among th~ most remarkable of religion .. rt 1 
.Job has been reasoning against Elohim. His three friends have ex--
hausted their arguments with him and are speechless. Then it is that 
the Lord Himself appears to conduct His own defense. The resUlt of 
Elohim1 s statement produces in Job the following reaction. "I had 
heard thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees thee; there ... 
fore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes (Job 42: 5-6. R~ S. V. ) . " 
Job ascribes to the experience elements of supra-rationality and pro ... 
foundest value and calls it holiness in its own right. 2 His personal 
reaction, like that of Xsaiah, referred to earlier,. is one of dis-
valuation. 
A close examination, however, of Elohim' s defense leads one 
to a disturbing conclusion. The argument commences as expected 
with the summons to .Job.. Then follow demonstrations of God's over-
whelming power, sublimity, greatness* and wisdom. The defense to 
this point seems fitting and capable even of being anticipated. It lacks 
only a conclusion to the eff~ct that rtMy ways are higher than your 
ways; in my deeds and my actions I have ends that you understand 
not" to be complete.. But such a conclusion is plainly not to be found-
quite the contrary, in fact. The emphasis of the passage is not on the 
rational. The main concern,_ Otto statesj- n ..• is with the non-
rational in the sense of the irrational, with sheer paradox, baffling 
comprehension, with that which challenges the 'reasonable' and what 
might be reasonably expected, which goes against the grain of reason.n3 
The passage relles on sheer absolute wondrousness to present 
the mysterium in upure non-rational form. 114 Note the example of the 
l. Ibid. ' p. 77. 
2. Ibid.' p. 153. 
--
3. lbid.,' p. 100., 
--
4. Ibid .. , p. 79. 
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eagle that 11 • .. • dwelleth and abideth on the rock,_ upon the crag of 
the rock, and the strong place, 11 whose tt ., • , young ones also suck up 
blood, and where the slain are,_ there she is (39t28~ 30). 11 "This eagle,11 
. otto suggests, "is no evidence for the teleological wisdom •.• but is 
1 
rather the creature of strangeness and marvel. " 
Consider also the description of the ostrich. If an evidenc-e- of 
wisdom or purposiveness in nature is being sought this example pro ... 
vides a disturbing antithesis. The ostrich rt .... which leaveth her eggs 
in the earth and warmeth them in the dust,_ and forgetteth that the foot 
may crush them or that the wild beast may break them. She is hard-
ened against her young ones as though they were not hers: her labor is 
in vain without fear; because God hath deprived her of wisdom;, neither 
hath he· Imparted to her understanding. n 2 
Additional examp~es of dysteleology are suggested by the wild 
ass (39t5) and the unicorn or wild ox (39:9). The very fact of their 
mysterious instincts and inexplicable behavior becomes one of baff-
ling significance. 
Examples of the hippopotamus (behemoth 40:15) or the croco-
dile (leviathan 41: 1) " • .. • express in masterly fashion the downright 
stupendousnessj the wellnigh daemonic and wholly incomprehensible 
character of the eternal creative power~ how, incalculable and 1 wholly 
other' j- it mocks at all conceiving but can yet stir the mind to its 
depths, fascinate and overbrim the heart._ n 3 
The "reasoningn of Elohim does more than convict Job. He is. 
made aware of an intrinsic value in the incomprehensible, one which 
is inexpressible,. positive and "fascinating. n 
1. Ibid .. , p. 79. 
2. Ibidq_ quoting Job 39%13-18. Emphasis Otto's .. 
3. Ibid.,' p. 80. 
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This [Otto concludes], is incommensurable with 
thoughts of rational human teleology and is not 
assimilated to them: it remains in all its mystery. 
But it is as it becomes felt in consciousness that 
Elohim is justified and at the same time Job's 
soul brought to peace~ n1 
It is in this passage, otto notes, that one receives an im-
pression of God which bursts the bounds of interpretation as mere 
personality. Elohim is seen as "supra-personal'1, 2 the nu;rninous, 
11wholly othern in character. 
1. Ibid. 
2~ Ibid. ' p. 200. 
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1. Individual Persons. 
The last manifestation of the Holy which will be explored is 
within the realm of individual persons.. In order to understand the im-
plications of this claim the relation of the Holy to the person must be 
examined in a different manner than has been done up to this point. 
As has already been stated Otto contends that all men have the 
predisposition to the numinous, This implies. that each human possess-
es ll • • • the faculty of receptivity and a principle of judgement and 
acknowledgement. 11 1 This claim does not suggest that all persons 
possess the capacity to produce cognitions of the numinous themselves. 
This capacity is confined to specially endowed persons. Such persons., 
it has been stated, are those possessing the gift of divination. 
Otto notes a parallel between the realm of the Holy and the 
realm of the esthetic. With regards to art what may appear on the 
first level as receptiveness developed, perhaps to the point of an abil,_ 
ity to respond and judge reappears within merely a few at the higher 
level of the artist. The artist possesses the ability to invent, create, 
compose~ and as such belongs to a different stage from the lover of 
art, The artist in the e.sthetic realm corresponds to the prophet in 
the religious realm.. '~The prophet, 11 Otto states, 11 ••• is the man in 
whom the Spirit shows itself alike as the power to hear the ' voice 
within r, and the power of divination. 11 2 
If the prophet represents a higher stage of relationship between 
man and the numinous he does not represent the highest. Beyond the 
prophet is a third stage, one of revelation. This stage, otto believes, 
is as underivable from the other two stage~ as was the stage of the 
L lbid. 1 p. 177. 
2. Ibid.' pp. 177-178 .. 
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prophet from that of the common men. nwe can look, beyond the 
prophet, to one in whom is found the Spirit in all its plenitude, and 
who at the same time in His person and in His performance is become 
most completely the object of divination,. in whom Ho~iness. is recog-
nized apparent. 11 1 
Otto's elaboration of this statement will now be offered with 
emphasis again upon one striking manifestation of the Holy - ~his time 
in a person. That person is. Jesus. 
Otto believes that manifestations ofthe Holy in persons is ob-
servable even today. Such a phenomenon may be witnessed in the re-
mote corners of the Mohammedan and Indian world. Now and then 
these 11holy men11 make their appearance. Each may be seen to pos-
sess a group of discipies. People come and go about them listening to 
their sayings.~ observing their miracles., watching their actions .. 
1 Logia' tales and leg.ends gather around them. 2 New brotherhoods 
are fo~ed. ''But the centre of it all~ 11 otto states, ''Is always the 
man himself, a 1 holy man' in his lifetimet and what sustains the move-
ment is. always the peculiar power of his personality.~ the special im-
3 pression he makes on the bystander. ·~ 
Informed individuals assure us1 otto notes, that ninety eight 
per cent of these 1 holy men' are imposters.. But even then the genuine 
two percent remain.. Of this latter group otto observes. 
The 1 holy man' or the 1 prophet' is from the outset, 
as regards the experience of the circle of his devo-
tees, something more than a 1 mere man. 1 He is the 
being of wonder and mystery, who somehow or other 
1. Ibid .. ' p. 178. 
2. otto cites as "a particular .striking case11 the collection of the 
Logia of Rama .... Krishna. 
3. otto,. The Idea ofthe Holy, p. 157. 
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is felt to belong to the higher order of things, to tp_e side of the numen 
itself. It is not that he himself teaches that he is such~ but that he is 
experienced as. such. 1 
Such present day examples demonstrate the fact that :men 
actually experience1' or sometim~s presume they experience,. holiness 
in the personality of individuals. uHow far more true~ n otto ex-
claims, ":must this not be of the early Christian community. n 2 
The origins of Christianity are only meaningful, otto believes, 
when interpreted in light of the numinous impression :made by Chr;i.st 
himself .. 
Otherwise it would be unintelligible how the Church 
could have come into existence at all. Mere proc-
1Iamation;. mere authoritative statement? cannot bring 
about these massive certainties and that impelling 
strength, that power to maintain and assert: itself, 
which were necessary if the Christian community 
was to come into being and which can be recognized in 
it as its unmistakable characteristics., 3 
In a later passage Otto supplements this observation with 
additional factors. which testify to the numinous character of Christ. 
To this place belong further the belief in Jesus' s 
supremacy over the daemonic world and the ten-. 
dency to legend that began to take effect from the 
start; the fact that His own relatives take Hi;m for 
a man 'possessed' t an involuntary acknowledgement 
of the ' numinous 1 impression He makes upon themt 
and in an especial degree the conviction that breaks 
spontaneously upon the minds of His disciples as by 
a sudden i:mpact.. won not from His teaching but from 
the very experience of Hi:mt that He is the 'Messiah'.,. 
the being who stood for the circle in which He moved 
1. lbid., p. 158. 
2. Ibid. 
3.. Ibid.' p. 156. 
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as the numinous. being par excell~nce"' 1 
Otto designates Peter's first confession as an example of a 
genuine discovery arising from the impression J"esus made upon him. 
Jesus recognized this factt according to Ottot when he said,_ It Flesh 
and blo'od hath not revealed this unto thee but my Father which is in 
Heaven (Matt. 16t15-17) .. 11 
With regard to the numinous impression left by Christ,. -can it 
be experienced today? 11How can we,. too, come to experience in Him 
1 holiness made manifest' ? " 2 Obviously not through some conceptual, 
ru1e, Otto states. "The experience must come"' not by demonstration~ 
but by pure contemplation, through the mind submitting itself unre-
servedly to the pure impression of the object .. 113 
By the 11impression of the object" Otto has reference in part to 
the apparently divergent lines of development which converge and cul-
minate in Jesus. Observe the development of Israel and ,Judah with 
their marvelous spiritual history. "Whoever sinks in contemplation 
of that great connected development of the Judaic religion which we 
speak of as the 1 Old Covenant up to Christ' must feel the stirrings of 
an intimation that something Eternal is there;- directing .and sustaining 
it and urging it to its consumation. The impression is simply 
irresistible. 11 4 
Observe further the stature of the personality of Christ,. His 
II 
.... ;firm,. unfaltering hold upon God~ His unwavering, unfailing 
righteousness, His certitude of conviction and assurance in action so 
mysterious and profound~ His spidtual fervor and beatitude .. " Whoever 
1. lbid.,, p. 159.-
2. Ibid.' p. 168. 
3 .. lbi'd. 
4. Ibid., p. 170. 
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considers all this must conclude, '1That is godlike and divine;. that is 
verily Holiness. n 1 
But beyond the impression of the numinous in the aspects of 
the person of Jesus already isolated is a still deeper manifestation of 
it .. In its most profound aspect the numinous is reflected in the Cross. 
The Cross becomes in an absolute sense the 1 mirror 
of the eternal Father; and not. of the 1 Father' alone -
'the highest rational interpretation of the holy - but of 
Holiness as such .... ,. The 38th chapter of .Job is a 
prophecy of Golgotha . . . In .Job the suffering of the 
righteous found its significance as the classic and 
crucial case of the revelation,. more immediately 
actual and in more palpable proximity than any other 
of the transcendent mysteriousness and 'beyondness1 
of God. The Cross of Christ, that monogram of the 
eternal mystery r is it13 completion. Here rational are 
enfolded with non-rational elements. the revealed 
commingled with the unrevealed, the most exalted 
love with the most awe.-inspiring 1 wrath' of the numen, 
and therefore~ in applying to the Cross of Christ the 
category 1 holy' ~: Christian religious feeling has given 
birth to a religious intuition profounder and more vital 
than any to be found in the whole history of religion. 2 
Otto notes with regret that the numinous character of Christ has 
been so radically obscured by th~ rationalizing of this religion. Chris-
tian exegetes have all too often theorized and dogmatized) deducing 
nnecessary truths" from what were meant to be rt ••• free-floating 
utterances and trial flights at expression of the numinous feeling. 11 3 
The !'esult has been the placing of rational concepts at the center of our 
religious interest ,... ttA place," he says "which nothing but the experi-
ence itself of God ought to occupy. 114 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. ' pp. 172-173. 
3. lbidq p. 171. 
4. Ibid. , PP~ 171-172 .. 
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E. Appraisal of otto' s Phenomenology 
It is contended that otto's phenomenological description of 
the numinous is unique and clear. This conclusion is supported by 
Mircea Eliade in The Sacred and the Profane. Professor Eliade re-
ferring to The Idea of the Holy states, "After forty years, Otto's 
analyses have not lost their value; readers of this book will profit by 
reading and reflecting on them. • . Gifted with great psychological 
subtlety, and thoroughly prepared by his twofold training as theologian 
and historian of religionsJc he succeeded in determining the content 
and specific characteristics of religious experience. tt 1 
otto 1 s initial division of the modes of religious experience into 
ideograms has the li;mitations which any analytic approach possesses,. 
viz~~ the portraying of one aspect of the numinous in an almost 11chem .... 
ical purity. 11 But Otto, himself recognizes the limitations of ideo;.. 
gram. Because of-this awareness his descriptions draw from exam-
ples - actual manifestations of the numinous. His wide acquaintance 
with religions in general makes this effort, it.is. felt, highly successfuL· 
One can anticipate a question as to the criter.ion for testing an 
experience to see whether it be a .genuine numinous manifestation or a 
counterfeit. If a rational formula is what is desired,_ Otto's entire 
formulation of the non-rational wouJ.d preclude such. 
It is expected that otto's reply to such a normative question 
would appeal to a test of time. Just as good and bad art, sublime or 
simple musict- etc. , eventually become separated out~ so too a genu-
ine manifestation of the numinous may be distinguished by its capacity 
to survive in a life; in a product of man's creativity, or focused in 
an object or a geographic location. rt is recognizable to the human 
L Eliade~ pp. 8J- 10 .. 
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who is so created as to be able to recognize it. 
If it is to be contended that otto's characterization of the 
numinous suffers too greatly from a lack of a normative criterion the 
judgment is accepted as not without a measure of justification. How-
ever, it is not clear how it is possible to admit. such a defect and still 
maintain the original conclusions which otto has drawn from a rich 
sampling of religious data. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
It is the purpose of this chapter to offer concluding remarks 
to this study. It has been the object of the ;investigation to expound the 
religious insights of Rudolf Otto. It has been contended that otto's 
thought is sufficiently unique to merit a detailed exposition. 
Chapters III and IV listed the weaknesses of otto1 s method. 
These will be summarized at this time. otto encounters difficulty in 
attempting to integrate the rational and non-rational elements o:l; re-
ligion... His theory of sche;rnatization is felt to be inconclusive... His 
contention for the autonomy of religion leads him to a radical separa-
tion of religion and the remainder of man's spiritual faculties ... 
The caus.e of this difficulty has been traced to a misuse of the 
Friesian philosophy. otto adopts the basic structure suggested by 
Fries with its culmination in the concept of Ahndung. But he alters the 
portion of the system which applies to religion in ord,er to support his 
own insistence upon the autonomy of religion.. In doing so he weakens 
his own system greatly by depriving it of a sufficient context. Nowhere 
in his writing does otto face the implications of an autonomy of religion., 
Chapter IV suggests a second difficulty in the thought of otto. 
1n his ·characterization of the religious experience otto fails to suggest 
any normative criteria for testing an experience as to its validity as a 
genuine religioU$ exper;ience. It is suggested, however, that this. de ... 
f'ect is not an oversight by otto. This condition follows as. a valid 
conclusion to the theory that religious intuition is on a level deeper 
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than rational thinking._ It is below conceptualization. Any test~ there...-
fore, o;[ the experience cannot draw upon rational concept for a norm 
of validity. To require an alternative conclusion to a theory of reli-
gion is to deny ottof s basic thesist viz.;. that religion is fundament-
ally .a feeling experience of the most profound kind. 
The strength of otto' s system does not lie in his insistence 
upon the autonomy of religion as he had hoped. It has been contended 
that Otto's greatest -eont=:ibution to religious knowledge is a descrip-
tion of the modes o;f .religious experience.. By the use of a variety of 
ideograms o±to has isolated separate aspects of the numinous. He has 
based his descriptions on a wide acquaintance with religions of the 
world and has suggested common themes running through all of them. 
In addition, he has characterized elements of the numinous which are 
uncommon and in tension .. 
By hiS -Own understanding of the uniqueness of religion he has 
o;tfered corrective ideas to those who would explain the origins of re,.. 
ligion in naturalis~ic terms. His sympathy with the ;mystics may be 
seen to stem from the task which he shared in common with themt- viz; •. , 
expressing in words. experiences that are more strongly felt than 
articulated. 
'Two of Qtto1.s chie;f contentions are suggested as crucial if re-
ligion i~ to retain any power in the lives of men in this generation. 
Firstt- his contention that .religion can never be exhaustively contained 
in rational theories or theologies must be taken seriously. 
Secondly otto's description of the Holy ;must be taken to mean 
that moments or places can at times become for us Holy> not profane. 
As suggested by Eliade,. modern man runs the risk of complete 
trdesacrelization. 11 1 The functions. o;t lifet- birth;.- marriage-1 death,. 
1. Eliade, p .. 17. 
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e.ven eating or building a home are no longer sacramental in nature .. 
They have become profane.. When this occurs religion has lost its 
power. In addition the mystery of nature has. been removed by the 
illusion of modern man that an analytic description of it means it is 
understood. To counteract such pervasive tendencies in our civili-
zation the sacremental aspect of life must become meaningful to us. 
Thisr :i.t is believed, can only be done when one gains an awarene~s. 
ofthe Holy. 
otto has attempted to awaken in us. such an awareness. It is 
suggested that his efforts can be successful, but only if one is of a 
disposition to listen - seriously and courageously .. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem which the thesis seeks to explore is Rudolf Otto's 
theory of religious knowledge.. The exposition of the· problem is di-
vided into three main divisions, otto's intellectual tradition.t- his 
methodology1 and his· phenomenological description of the non-rational 
in religion. 
The f;i.rst section, which attempts to isolate Otto's intellectual 
he:dtage co;rnmences with a description ·of otto's educational affili-
ations. Special emphasis is placed upon his duties in various German 
universities. Justification for this emphasis is the observation that 
the insights which come to fruition in his most famous work, The ldea 
of the Holy, may be studied in various stages of development in each 
particular university setting. Various other of Otto's writings are 
expounded and placed in the context of Otto's teaching career .. 
The thesis contends that the mos.t influent~al figures upon Otto 1 s 
intellectual development are Luthert Schleiermacher, and Jakob Fries. 
The thought of each of these men is examined with emphasis upon the 
particular facet of the thought of each which bear,g significantly on 
otto's own thought. 
Luther is explored to gain an understanding of the non-rational 
element in religion. The exposition of Luther is primarily otto's own~ 
a fact which a;i.ds appreciably in an understanding of his affect upon 
ot.:f:o. Luther's concept of faith is correlated with Otto's later theory 
of the autonomy of religion. 
The influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher is explored in de-
tail. It is held that Schleiermacher' s influence strengthens otto's 
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own contention that reUgion is in danger of being destroyed by the 
process of rationalization. Schleierm.acher' s emphasis upon feeling 
is for otto a necessary corrective to this tendency. Schleiermacher' S 
three .... fold division of. lmowledge is examined as expounded by Otto. 
otto's objections to Schleiermacher' s theory D:f religion are noted in 
Chapter m. 
The thesis contendS- that nowhere does otto formulate a com-
plete philosophy of religion in a ;rigorous, systematic way. It holds 
rather that Otto adapts the philosophy of religion of Jakob Fries). alter-
ing it only in the places where conflict is noted with his own overriding 
emphasis upon the autonomy of religion. On the basis of this conclu-
sion Fries' philosophy is explored in detail. Access to Fries' thought 
is gained in the main from a study of Otto' s. published workj The: 
Philosophy of Religion. 
The development of Fries 1 thought is traced through his three 
levels of lmowledge. Fries 1 dependence upon Kant is um;nistakable 
and a comparison of their thought is frequently necessary. The highest 
form of insight characterized by Fries as esthetic intuition is defined. 
Special emphasis is placed upon this level of .knowledge, for it is held 
to bear in great measure on otto1 s characterization of religion. 
After a brief statement of a problem which arises in attempting 
to d·etect the influence of Albrect Ritsch1 upon otto., the inquiry turns 
to Otto's own formul~tion of religious philosophy. Religion as a sep-
arate, irreducible dimension of human existence is suggested as a 
theme to· characterize all of Otto's published efforts commencing with 
The Idea of the Holy. 
otto believes that religion can be explained in terms of a cate-
gory of the mind. Such a category is conceived of in Kantian terms 
but distinct from any category suggested by Kant. The category is 
presented with a unique datum the referent of which is the source of 
\ 
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all religious intuitions. This datum is characterized by otto as a 
positive feeling experience. Concepts which attempt to describe the 
experience are held to· be only symbolic"' The experience is non-
conceptual or non-rational.. otto1 s designation of this non-rational 
element as. the "numino11s" is noted especially as it relates to aspects 
of religion which ~ conceptual. 
'The study holds that major weaknesses. are encountered in 
otto's attempt to integrate the rational and non-rational elements of 
religion. It suggests that otto's. case for the autonomy of religion 
suffer.s·;from a failure to adequately explain the relation of religion to 
other factors of man's .spiritual being, vizq moralityJ rationality, 
and esthetic sensitivity.. It concludes that this defect stems in great 
·part fr.om otto's. adopting the Friesian philosophy while rejecting 
Fries 1· conclusions about religion. otto nowhere faces the implica-
tions of his rejection of certain key aspects of Fries' thinking. 
Chapter IV deals with otto's phenomenological description of 
the modalities of .rellgious experience. Because otto has contended 
that the experience is incapable of precise conceptualization he adopts 
a method of symbolism which utilizes analogies taken from man' s 
11non-religious 11 experiences. otto designates these symbols as "ideo-
grams. n By choosing several ideograms he hopes to suggest the 
different modes the religious experience may take. 
otto devises the ideogram mysterium trem~ndum et fascinans 
as a symbolic formula for the non-rational exper,ience. Tre;mendum 
suggests the awesome and fearful in religion. It explains the reaction 
of trembling on the part of the experient. lt carries with it notions of 
restless energy~ Mysterium suggests one of the most pervasive of 
religious intuitions - the tendency to regard God as uwholly other". 
The doctrines. which otto believes are valid approximations of this 
intuition, and those which are not are investigated in connection with 
0 
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mysterium. Still a third element of the non-rational exper;ience is to 
be noted. This is symbolized by the ideogram fascinans. The experi-
ence may be fearful, awesomef but it is at the same time fascinating, 
captivating. It draws with an uncanny charm completely unlike a 
"natural" experience. 
All modes of numinous experience are believed to have close 
connection to mysticism. The relation of each particular ideogram 
for the numinous is shown to lend intelligibility to mystical utterances. 
otto's interest in mysticism is emphasized with his insistance that 
his method and the mystic 1 s method share the common task of com,.. 
municating an experience fundamentally non-conceptual in nature. 
Communication of a religious experience is only successful to 
the degree that the listener is made to feel something of the experience 
himself. Otto's method is in a large measure evocative. Recognizing 
this fact he places great emphasis upon examples of the non-rational, 
or the~ numinous1 as it. appears in. art, ritual, architecture, music and 
persons. For this reason a portion of Chapter IV attempts an exposi-
tion of manifestations of the numinous. 
It is contended that with reference to the ;non-rational in re-
ligion as he defines it, otto is highly successful in its description. He 
shows an awareness of a great variety of religions and utilizes his 
own religious intuition to offer a corrective to other religious theo-
rists. This is especially evident in his explanations of the origin of 
religion incivilizati.ons. He suggests fresh approaches to Christian 
doctr.ines which provide a corrective to attempts at over-rationalization 
of this religion. His description of the numinous in persons adds yet 
another facet to the figure of Jesus. 
Chapter V of the study summarizes the weaknesses of otto 1 s 
system as well as emphasizing the strong aspects. It concludes with 
an application of otto's category of the Holy to the· contemporary state 
of civilization. 
